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PRESENTATION
This is the eighth year th a t the w eekly  dispatches transm itted during a year by 
ECLAC W ashington to  ECLAC Santiago, and to other subregional o ffices, are gathered in a 
single docum ent.1
For their presentation here, the dispatches are classified by subject and ordered 
chronologically w ith in  each chapter, each heading indicating the relative saliency those  
issues had w ith in  the international economic agenda.
The three most im portant issues th a t dominated the international econom ic agenda, 
throughout the concluding year, are listed in this presentation according to  w h at, 
avow edly , is a very subjective ordering of their relative im portance.
1 ) The m idterm  legislative elections in the United S tates led to  the first Republican 
dom inated Congress in forty years. H ow ever, a m ost hopeful signal of bipartisanship 
em erged, even before the inauguration of the new  Congress, w ith  the agreem ent to  
approve the results of the Uruguay Round. Only tim e can tell if such bipartisanship will 
prevail in the remaining tw o  years of the present Adm inistration.
2) The approval of the Uruguay Round results by the U .S . Congress w as  one out of 
a "triple play" accomplished during the year in international trade. The second out w as the  
APEC sum m it in Jakarta , setting the distant but fixed date of the year 2 0 2 0  for the  
achievem ent of trade and investm ent liberalization. The third out w as the agreem ent to  
liberalize trade by the year 2 0 0 5 , from Alaska to  Patagonia, th a t em anated from the  
Sum m it of the Am ericas, held in M iami from 9 to  11 Decem ber.
3) Finally, for the developing economies the most relevant events had to  do w ith  
private capital flow s, due to  the substantial rise in these econom ies' direct access to  
increasingly globalized financial m arkets. This positive trend, characterized by growing  
foreign direct investm ent and long term  portfolio investm ents in emerging stock m arkets, 
w as due to  both mutually supportive internal and external factors. Among these factors  
figures prominently the return of m acroeconomic stability in Latin Am erica and the 
Caribbean and the decline in interest rates in the industrialized economies.
Some of these issues w ere  described in the w eekly  dispatches transm itted regularly 
by ECLAC W ashington throughout the year. The purpose of gathering these dispatches is 
to  m ake them  available for easier consultation in a single volum e, in case the W ashington  
D .C . vantage point they present still has some testim onial value.
To conclude, those readers that are not familiarized w ith  these dispatches should be 
reminded that they try  to remain w ithin the self-imposed limit of 7 5 0  w ords, because their 
purpose is only to  bring an issue to the reader's attention.
1 ECLAC  Washington, International Economic Highlights 1987  (LC/WAS/L.2) 17 August 
1988; 1988  (LC/WAS/L.4) 17 March 1989; 1989  (LC/WAS/L.8) 15 March 1990; 1990  
(LC/WAS/L. 11 ) 22  March 1991; 1991 (LC/WAS/L. 14) 11 March 1992; 1992  (LC/WAS/L. 17) 11 
March 1993; 1993  (LC/WAS/23) 30  March 1994.

I. THE WORLD ECONOMY
1.1. THE JOBS S U M M IT
(W D W /1 0 /9 4  2 3  M arch 1 9 9 4 )
W hen the Group of Seven announced in Tokyo last year th a t President Clinton 
would host a "jobs sum m it" this year in Detroit, John Maynard Keynes m ust have turned in 
his grave. Keynes asserted th a t m arkets by them selves are unable to  achieve full 
em ploym ent, or to  overcome "unem ploym ent equilibrium," understood as a "condition of 
long-lasting joblessness."
Today, some of the remedies proposed by Keynes to  overcome this "equilibrium" 
have been disproved, particularly by the inflationary pressures attributed to  governm ent 
spending. H ow ever, as suggested by Robert Heilbroner in the N ew  York Review  of Books. 
M arch 3 , 1 9 9 4 ), present circum stances in the industrialized countries can be characterized  
as "a state of persisting unem ploym ent resembling th a t of the 1 9 3 0 s ."
The figures prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Developm ent (OECD), to serve as background to the Detroit sum m it, reveal certain  
contrasts in the behavior of the industrialized economies th a t support some of Heilbroner's 
concerns.
For instance, the unem ploym ent rate in Europe last year stood a t near 12 per cent. 
By contrast, while in the United S tates unem ploym ent reached, in 1 9 9 3 , only 6 .7  percent, 
the relatively mild reactivation experienced by the U .S . econom y, at 2 .7  percent, hardly is 
making a dent on th a t figure.
In the term s of the deputy director of the French Institute for International Relations 
Dominique Moisi, quoted by Thom as Friedman in The N ew  York T im es, such levels of 
unem ploym ent are "the proof that governm ents are not e ffec tive ."  As described by 
Columbia University Professor Edmund S. Phelps, in The W all S treet Journal, "the 
unem ploym ent rate u ltim ately returns to  some basic level --dubbed the natural 
unem ploym ent rate-- that is independent of the artificial forces of m oney, its supply and 
velocity."
From this perspective, Japan is exceptional w ith  2 .9  percent unem ploym ent. 
H ow ever, this figure disguises those w orkers kept in the payroll by the increasingly 
challenged tradition of lifetim e unem ploym ent.
T w o  of the explanatory factors offered by Professor Phelps to  account for the  
"natural unem ploym ent rate" are not susceptible to  individual governm ent m anagem ent. 
There is little th a t an individual governm ent can do to  m oderate "global factors," such as 
"world oil prices and world real interest rates." The one factor th a t individual governm ents  
control fully is "big increases in payroll and /personal income taxes," considered by 
Professor Phelps to be "a dom estic source of much of the unem ploym ent increase in 
several countries." This factor explains m ost of the difference that presently exists
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betw een average m anufacturing com pensation in Germ any and in the United S tates , at 
$ 2 6  and $ 1 6  an hour, respectively.
The United S tates is confronting a different situation. A t issue is not job creation, 
since the United S tates in the last tw o  decades created more than 3 6  million jobs, while  
Europe barely created one fourth of th a t am ount in the same period. According to  U .S. 
Labor Secretary Robert Reich, the problem in the United S tates is th a t m ost of these new  
jobs are low-paying jobs. Thus, the basic question before the Detroit sum m it w as  
described by Secretary Reich, the sum m it's inspirer, as follows: "Are w e  condem ned to  
choose betw een more jobs but greater inequality and insecurity as w e  have in this country, 
or better jobs but higher unem ploym ent and a thicker social safety  net, as in Europe?"
No w onder, great expectations w ere played down in advance by the hosts and not 
even a final com m unique w as issued a t the sum m it's closure. U .S. Treasury Secretary  
Lloyd Bentsen just read a sum m ary statem ent highlighting the main points discussed. 
Am ong these, the attendance of "some 2 4  ministers" w as seen as "a clear demonstration  
of the seriousness w ith  w hich our nations v iew  the jobs problem." Also, Secretary  
Bentsen emphasized th a t this w as the first ministerial meeting of the G -7 th a t included the 
labor m inisters, amounting to  an expansion of the G -7 's  traditional agenda, beyond interest 
rates and exchange rates.
As described by Secretary Bentsen, the meeting w as divided into the following  
"four structured discussions": 1) the world em ploym ent problem; 2) creating em ploym ent 
opportunities in the global econom y; 3) technology, innovation and the private sector; and
4) labor m arkets, investm ent in human capital, and the social safety  net.
The Detroit discussions, concluded the U .S. Treasury Secretary, w ere  a "first step," 
th a t will be transm itted to  the G -7 leaders, scheduled to  m eet in Naples during the  
sum m er, to  help them  decide how  to  "strengthen grow th , create more jobs, better jobs, 
and reduce unem ploym ent."
A  good sum m ary of the main conclusion w as offered by Chancellor of the  
Exchequer Kenneth Clarke. He said th a t "during the discussions there w as  considerable 
agreem ent among the ministers th a t there is a problem of structural unem ploym ent that 
w o n 't be solved by grow th alone."
In the more graphic term s of U .S. Secretary of Com m erce Ronald H. Brown, "the  
old economic axiom that a rising tide raises all boats does not necessarily apply. There are 
a lot of people in our econom ies w ho  don 't have boats or whose boats have holes in the  
bottom ."
1.2. THE IM F 'S  FIRST W O RLD ECO NO M IC OUTLOOK (WEO) 
(W D W /1 4 /9 4  2 5  M ay 1 9 9 4 )
The advanced copy of the first W EO w as released to  the press on April 2 0 , as 
usual, just before the Fund-Bank Spring m eetings. In tw o  volum es, the first contains the
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main report and the second the supplem entary analyses, excluding only the full statistical 
appendix, w hich will be included in the W EO 's final version, to  be released som etim e in 
M ay.
The main report contains the following chapters: I) overview; II) world economic 
situation and short-term  prospects; III) fostering job creation, grow th , and price stability in 
industrial countries; IV) w h y  are some developing countries failing to  catch up? and V ) 
stabilization, reform , and the role of external financing in the countries in transition.
The second volume contains the following annexes: I) the Uruguay Round: results 
and implications; II) information content of the yield curve; and III) adjustm ent and recovery  
in Latin Am erica and the Caribbean.
The world econom y's recent perform ance is m arked by "the nonsynchronous nature 
of the cyclical m ovem ents" th a t prevail among the industrial countries. These contrasting  
performances are found among tw o  distinct groups of countries. The first group, 
comprising the United S tates, the United Kingdom and Canada, "entered into recession in 
1 9 9 0 -9 1 , and these countries are all now  experiencing relatively robust recoveries." The  
second group, including Japan and the continental European econom ies, "did not fall into 
recession until 1 9 9 2 ."  In these last countries, the "downturns appear to  have bottomed  
out but clear signs of recovery have not yet em erged." Except in the United S tates, 
among the industrial countries, "the recent recessions rank among the most severe in the  
postw ar period and in most cases have been considerably more protracted than initially 
expected."
Contrastingly, the "robust economic grow th" among the developing countries is 
seen as "one of the most encouraging aspects of global econom ic trends in recent years." 
H ow ever, this "pattern of grow th is likely to remain very uneven," w ith  m any bright spots 
found in Asia and Latin A m erica, while among the low -grow th countries are "m any of the  
poorest countries, especially in A frica, as well as a number of low er m iddle-income 
countries in other regions."
Finally, contrasts are also found among the so-called "econom ies in transition."
First, countries such as the Baltic S tates, the Czech Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Albania 
and Slovenia "have achieved a reasonable measure of m acroeconom ic stability" and have 
begun to  grow again. Second, those countries th a t "have not ye t im plem ented appropriate 
stabilization policies have continued to  experience high inflation and substantial output 
losses."
In the short-run, "world output is projected to  expand by 3 percent in 1 9 9 4  and by 
3  3 /4  percent in 1 9 9 5 ,"  w ith  the "cyclical disparities" among the industrial countries 
"expected to  diminish betw een 1 9 9 4 -9 5 ."  H ow ever, "w ith  the exception of the United 
States, margins of slack in the industrial countries remain large, and indications of a 
turnaround are still tentative in m any cases."
This contrasts w ith  the prospects for the developing countries, w here aggregate  
output "is projected to  continue to  advance at a rate of 5 1 /2  to  6 percent-s im ilar to  the  
rate of increase in 1 9 9 2 -9 3 ."  Am ong the developing countries of the W estern  
Hem isphere, "overall grow th is projected to  be som ew hat slow er in 1 9 9 4  than in 1 9 9 3 ,  
but to  return to  a stronger pace thereafter."
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In the separate appendix dedicated to  "adjustm ent and recovery in Latin Am erica  
and the Caribbean," it is recognized th a t "considerable economic progress has been 
achieved in the region." H ow ever, among the m any challenges th a t remain "there are only 
a fe w  countries in w hich per capita incomes are rising a t rates higher than 2 percent a 
year."
Another challenge in Latin Am erica is th a t "although there has been a significant 
im provem ent in public sector saving in the region as a w hole , gross national saving 
declined to  an average of about 18 percent of GDP in 1 9 9 0 -9 3 , compared w ith  2 0  percent 
in 1 9 8 7 -8 9 ."  The challenge is th a t "stronger economic grow th requires an increase in 
dom estic saving and investm ent." Additionally, "despite a reduced debt burden," external 
debt "remains high in m any countries, and difficulties in debt m anagem ent could return if 
interest rates in the industrial countries rise from their current low  levels."
Large inflow s of private capital have "com plicated economic policy m anagem ent."  
To counter the currency appreciation and higher interest rates th a t these flow s are causing, 
fiscal adjustm ent is suggested as "an appropriate alternative to o ffset the e ffects  of capital 
inflows th a t m ight not be available in the medium to longer run."
Finally, "a large number of people in the region continue to live in extrem e poverty." 
Beyond the contribution th a t sustained grow th will make to  reduce poverty, the countries 
of Latin Am erica and the Caribbean "need to  continue their efforts to  improve the targeting  
of social spending programs and to  give priority to expenditure on social infrastructure  
such as education and preventive health care."
1.3 . THE NAPLES S U M M IT
(W D W /2 2 /9 4  2 0  July 1 9 9 4 )
Some observers hoped th a t President Clinton would accomplish in Naples similar 
results to  those he attained last year in the Tokyo sum m it. H ow ever, there w ere no 
dram atic breakthroughs in Naples and the results w ere limited to  those issues w here there 
had been some degree of advanced preparation.
This w as the case, for instance, w ith  the issue of jobs and grow th , because of the  
preparations carried out in the previous "jobs sum m it," held last March in Detroit 
(W D W /1 0 /9 4 ) . Consequently, the final com m unique issued in Naples reflects several 
conclusions brought over from  Detroit.
First, the communique adm its th a t "encouraging results are emerging. Recovery is 
under w ay . N ew  jobs have been created, and in more and more of our countries people 
are getting back to  w ork , inflation is now a t the low est levels in over three decades and 
the conditions are in place for strong and lasting non-inflationary grow th."
Even so, there is no room for com placency, since "unem ploym ent remains far too  
high, w ith  over 2 4  million unem ployed" in the G-Seven countries. Such levels of 
unem ploym ent are characterized as "an unacceptable w aste ,"  th a t is "particularly 
damaging w hen . . .  it is concentrated among young people and those w ho have been out
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of w ork for a long tim e." This leads to  adopting the activist stance to  fight unem ploym ent 
that em anated from the Detroit conference.
The communique confirms the actions identified in D etroit, regarding grow th and 
stability and also job creation. Additionally, a set of "structural measures" w as  identified: 
first, increase investm ent in people, through developing "a culture of lifetim e learning"; 
second, reduce labor rigidities; third, "pursue active labour m arket policies"; fourth, 
"encourage and promote innovation and the spread of new  technologies"; fifth , "pursue 
opportunities to  promote job creation in areas w here new  needs now  exist, such as quality 
of life, and protection of the environm ent"; finally, "promote com petition, through  
eliminating unnecessary regulations and through removing im pedim ents to  small and 
medium-sized firm s."
By contrast w ith  this very well-prepared issue, the introduction by the U .S . 
delegation of a less prepared initiative on trade, led to  no concrete results. The heads of 
state and governm ent of the G-Seven declared th a t they "are determined to  ratify  the  
Uruguay Round Agreem ents and to establish the W TO  (World Trade Organization) by 
January 1st, 1 9 9 5  and call on other countries to  do the sam e." It w as precisely the recent 
approval of the Uruguay Round that generated the opposition against the U .S . initiative to  
open m arkets in telecom m unications, financial services and other issues not dealt w ith  in 
the Round.
According to  the notes taken by an "official note-taker" during the closed session of 
Saturday morning, published in the following M onday's W all S treet Journal, alm ost all the  
participants w ere against a new  trade initiative. President M itterand w as perhaps the most 
outspoken. He w as quoted as saying th a t those w ho proposed the new  initiative w ere  
"like crusaders before the Holy Sepulcher. W e have barely com pleted the Uruguay cycle . .
. now w e  m ust add to  it. Politically it's  very difficult for us."
In the end, the communique said "on new  international trade issues w e  encourage 
w ork under w a y  in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developm ent) to  
study the interaction of international trade rules and com petition policies. W e support the 
further developm ent of international investm ent rules in order to  rem ove obstacles to  
foreign direct investm ent." Also, the participants welcom ed "the w ork on the relation 
betw een trade and environm ent in the new  W T O ." They called for "intensified efforts to  
improve our understanding of new  issues including em ploym ent and labour standards and 
their implications for trade policies." To conclude, the communique did not close the door 
to  discussing these new  issues, since next year's meeting in Halifax "will review  progress 
on these issues."
Alm ost unanimously, the U .S. media interpreted this as a setback. H ow ever, a 
"senior administration official" quoted in The W ashington Post offered a d ifferent 
perspective. He said th a t it is the U .S . governm ent's "responsibility to keep pushing -- 
even if th a t made the other sum m it attendees uncom fortable." He also said, "w e  see our 
role as provocateurs. If the United S tates did not take the initiative a t the sum m its, 
nothing would happen. W e are alw ays kicking, prodding, pulling. T h a t's  our job."
Finally, a conspicuous absentee w as  the U .S . dollar. There w as  no m ention in the  
communique about coordinated actions to  stop the dollar's fall. By contrast, Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin w as present as a "full participant" in the political discussions.
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Looking tow ard  Halifax, the communique says th a t tw o  questions w ill be addressed: 
"(1) H ow  can w e  assure th a t the global econom y of the 2 1 s t century will provide 
sustainable developm ent to  the people of our nations and the world? (2) W h at fram ew ork  
of institutions w ill be required to  m eet these challenges in the 2 1 s t. century?" This last 
w as interpreted as a call to  "renew  and revitalize" the Bretton W oods institutions.
1.4 . THE IM F 'S  SECOND W O RLD ECONOM IC OUTLOOK (WEQ) 
(W D W /2 8 /9 4  5 O ctober 1 9 9 4 )
This year's  second W EO contains a chapter dedicated to  "the postw ar economic 
achievem ent," since the annual m eetings of the W orld Bank and the IM F include a special 
conference to  m ark the fiftie th  anniversary of the Bretton W oods institutions.
The world econom y offers a positive background to  the Madrid m eetings, because 
"the recovery of world activ ity  and trade became more firm ly established during the first 
half of 1 9 9 4 ."  A lso, "world output is projected to  expand by 3  percent in 1 9 9 4  and by 3 
1 /2  percent in 1 9 9 5 , tw ice  as rapidly as in 1 9 9 0 -9 3 ."
Am ong the industrialized econom ies, "continental W estern  Europe and Japan have 
now  begun to  em erge from  some of the deepest recessions in half a century. A t the same 
tim e, upswings have gained m om entum  in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia while  
in the United S tates a high level of capacity utilization has already been restored."
By contrast, the "continued strong perform ance" of the developing countries 
"masks considerable diversity." Still, "grow th in the developing econom ies is expected to  
average 5 1 /2  percent in 1 9 9 4 -9 5 , close to  the rate of expansion in 1 9 9 2 -9 3 ."
Finally, among the "transition econom ies," those th a t "first and m ost boldly 
im plem ented m arket reforms" are "now growing, or are expected to  begin to  grow in the  
near term ." M eanw hile , "output continues to  contract, or remains stagnant," among those 
transition economies that "have yet to  contain governm ent budget deficits and to  reduce 
and stabilize inflation a t low levels."
Briefly, "the marked slow dow n in world trade and grow th in the early 1 9 9 0 s  -- 
which occurred despite the strength of economic activ ity  in the developing countries as a 
group during this period -- appears to  have run its course."
The average grow th projections for the developing countries in 1 9 9 4 -9 5  remain  
alm ost unchanged. For instance, average grow th in those countries of the W estern  
Hemisphere "is projected to  slow  to 2 3 /4  percent in 1 9 9 4 , w ith  w eaker than expected  
grow th in M exico and increased difficulties in Venezuela o ffset by upward revisions to the 
projections for Argentina and Brazil."
The m edium -term  projections for the industrial countries are based on the following  
assumptions: current structural, fiscal and m onetary policies; constant real exchange rates; 
and stable real com m odity prices.
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Based on these assumptions, "real GDP grow th in the United S tates is expected to  
decline in 1 9 9 5  and beyond to  levels consistent w ith  potential output grow th of 2  1 /2  
percent, and inflation is projected to stabilize a t about 3  percent." In the other industrial 
countries "as a group, grow th is projected to  pick up from  2 1 /4  percent in 1 9 9 4  to  more 
than 3  percent in 1 9 9 6 -9 9 ."
H ow ever, w ithout the assumptions of "current fiscal policy and a noninflationary 
m onetary stance," there are several risks. First, "the extent of the slack is, or will be 
overestim ated." The other "related risk" is th a t "m onetary policy will not be tightened  
sufficiently rapidly during the recovery phase of the cycle, either because the am ount of 
slack is overestim ated or because the stance of m onetary policy is judged to  be tighter 
than is actually the case."
A  specific chapter is dedicated to  analyze "the substantial rise in private capital 
flow s to  m any developing countries in recent years." The internal and external 
circum stances th a t account for these capital flow s are first, "the successful adjustm ent 
and stabilization efforts," added to the "sluggishness of activ ity , and hence of the demand  
for funds, and the associated decline in interest rates in the industrial countries."
By contrast w ith  the experience of the previous decade, w hen the developing 
countries "attracted very little foreign capital," presently "a substantial part of total flow s  
is now  private, non-debt creating capital." Thus, "annual average net flow s to developing 
countries, excluding exceptional financing, fell from $ 3 0  billion during the 1 9 7 7 -8 2  period 
to  under $9  billion during 1 9 8 3 -8 9 , but they have subsequently risen significantly to  an 
average of alm ost $ 9 4  billion during the 1 9 9 0 -9 3  period."
The countries of the W estern Hemisphere, "especially M exico Argentina and Chile, 
have also benefited considerably from foreign direct investm ent, w hich has am ounted to  
over $ 1 2  billion annually in the recent period." Portfolio investm ent flow s "have averaged  
$ 2 5  billion a year, partially offset by an average outflow  of over $7 billion a year over the 
period 1 9 9 0 -9 3 ."
The advance copy of the second W EO w as released, on Septem ber 2 8 , in tw o  
volumes. The first volume contains the main report, w ith  the following chapters: 1 ) 
econom ic prospects and policies; 2) the world econom y in 1 9 9 4 -9 5 ; 3) using the recovery  
w isely in the industrial countries; 4) the recent surge in capital flow s to  developing 
countries; 5) stabilization, transform ation, and fiscal adjustm ent in the transition  
economies; and 6) the postwar economic achievem ent. The second volume contains 
supplem entary analyses, including boxes and tw o  annexes on: 1 ) European economic 
integration and 2) the medium term  scenarios for industrial countries.
The final version of the W EO will be released by the end of October and it will also 
include the full statistical appendix.
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1.5. THE APEC V IS IO N
(W D W /3 3 /9 4  9 Novem ber 1 9 9 4 )
N ext w eek . President Clinton will go to  Bogor, Indonesia, to  participate in the so- 
called "leaders m eeting," to  avoid using the term  heads of s tate , of the Asia-Pacific  
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum . This will be the second sum m it of APEC, to  provide 
encouragem ent and guidance to  the process of trade and investm ent liberalization in the  
Asia-Pacific region.
The first m eeting took place last year in Seattle and marked the initiation of a 
process aimed at providing APEC w ith  a vision. In Seattle , the "Economic Vision 
Statem ent" issued by the APEC leaders, "welcom ed the challenge . . .  to  achieve free  
trade in the Asia- Pacific." This challenge w as the main thrust of the report presented by 
APEC's Eminent Persons Group (EPG), chaired by C. Fred Bergsten from  the well know n, 
W ashington-based th ink-tank, Institute of International Economics (ME).
This year's APEC Sum m it will review  a second report, issued in response to  the  
suggestion m ade to the EPG, by the Ministers that m et in Seattle last year "to present 
further more specific proposals on how  the recommended long-term vision m ight be 
realized."
The second EPG report responds to that suggestion by listing a set of principles, to  
guide the process of trade and investm ent liberalization. These principles are: free trade  
and investm ent, international cooperation, regional solidarity, mutual benefit, mutual 
respect and egalitarianism , pragm atism , decision-making based on consensus, flexibility in 
the im plem entation, and "open regionalism."
Based on these principles, the EPG's second report recom m ends to  the APEC  
leaders m eeting in Bogor, "to adopt a comprehensive program to realize the vision of free 
and open trade in the region." This program would initiate the process of trade and 
investm ent liberalization by the year 2 0 0 0  and conclude it by 2 0 2 0 .
If adopted, this "top-dow n" com m itm ent will m ark a significant departure from the  
more m odest procedures and objectives that w ere originally envisaged for the APEC forum. 
Consequently, it should not be a surprise that some profound, though apparently  
bridgeable, differences appeared among the EPG members.
The existence of these differences w as confirmed by the Japanese m em ber of the  
EPG, Hitotsubashi University Professor Ippei Y am azaw a, in an article entitled  
"Regionalization of the W orld Economy: A  Japanese V ie w ."  According to  Professor 
Y am azaw a , "there w ere differences w ith in  the group that resulted in am biguity in the  
report regarding such issues as the stress on APEC liberalization relative to  m ultilateral and 
unilateral efforts , and w hether APEC liberalization should be applied to  non-m em bers on 
unconditional MFN or reciprocal FTA basis."
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Additional evidence exists that no solid unanim ity lies behind the second EPG report 
on "achieving the APEC vision." From none other than w ith in  the ranks of the private 
sector in the United S tates has com e out a call for skepticism .
The influential President's Advisory Com m ittee on Trade Policy and Negotiations  
(ACTPN), on October 3 1 , 1 9 9 4 , issued a set of "recom m endations on APEC," proposing 
th a t "the United S tates support a three part agenda for APEC w hich would move tow ards  
a balanced, fair trade environm ent progressively." First, "set short-term , tw e n ty  four 
m onth, objectives for existing APEC working groups in areas th a t will m ake a tangible 
difference in private sector commercial dealings, such as investm ent, m utual recognition 
agreem ents, and custom s facilitation." Second, "set equally short-term  objectives for 
further progress in APEC on unresolved issues from  the Uruguay Round, such as financial 
services and telecom m unications." Third, "use Uruguay Round com m itm ents and 
discussions as a point of departure for further APEC w ork on tariffs , non-tariff barriers, 
intellectual property protections, and other issues in the sam e tim e fram e."
This evidently is a more m odest agenda than the ambitiously distant goal of 
achieving free trade in the year 2 0 2 0 . On that goal, the ACTPN "believes th a t pursuit of 
free trade in the Asia Pacific is a laudable goal if it does not detract from progress tow ard  
interm ediate steps th a t will advance U .S . and regional economic interests in the short 
term ."
Concretely, the ACTPN says th a t it has "three principal concerns about making free  
trade by a date certain the linchpin of either U .S. policy or the APEC agenda." First, "any 
date th a t w e  have seen suggested is too far aw ay. The U .S . private sector will have 
irrevocably lost too m any opportunities if real progress takes decades. Second, if the  
Leaders w ere to  shift the focus of APEC's efforts to  such a broad agenda too soon, the  
resulting reallocation of APEC's limited resources could derail the useful progress being 
made in the working groups. Third, putting broad free trade negotiations a t the top of the  
regional agenda m ay provide key members of APEC w ith  an excuse to  delay settling  
crucial, unresolved bilateral m arket access issues by deflecting such discussions to  the  
APEC forum on a more protracted tim etable."
W hich of these tw o  "approaches" will become the APEC "vision" will be known  
next w eek . The APEC leaders have to  choose betw een the "top-dow n" approach of 
adopting a calendar for trade and investm ent liberalization, or the "bottom s-up" approach 
of achieving intrinsically justified "building block initiatives," as interm ediate steps tow ard  
an undetermined goal.
1.6. THE APEC S U M M IT
(W D W /3 5 /9 4  23  November 1 9 9 4 )
A t the end of the sum m it in Bogor, Indonesia, the leaders of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum issued "a declaration of common resolve," setting the  
group's vision (W D W /3 3 /9 4 ) on "the long-term goal of free and open trade and 
investm ent."
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In such a diverse grouping of "developed, new ly industrializing and developing 
econom ies," now  enhanced by Chile's admission as the eighteenth m em ber, agreem ents  
have to  avoid embarrassing details and be adopted a t a very general level. A lso, as 
revealed by the sum m it declaration, it m ust help to  set distant and relatively ambiguous 
goals.
In these term s, the APEC leaders announced the "com m itm ent to  com plete the  
achievem ent of our goal of free and open trade in Asia Pacific no later than the year 
2 0 2 0 ."  Additionally, in recognition of diversity, the agreed "pace of im plem entation" is 
based on "the differing levels of econom ic developm ent among APEC econom ies, w ith  the  
industrialized economies achieving the goal of free and open trade and investm ent no later 
than the year 2 0 1 0  and developing economies no later th a t the year 2 0 2 0 ."
Having set the goal, the APEC leaders emphasize their "strong opposition to  the  
creation of an inward-looking trading bloc." Thus, in APEC, free and open trade will be 
pursued "in a m anner th a t will encourage and strengthen trade and investm ent 
liberalization in the world as a w hole ." Because "the outcom e," according to  the  
com m uniqué, "will not only be the actual reduction of barriers" w ith in  the group, "but also 
betw een APEC econom ies and non-APEC econom ies."
W ithout going into further details, for instance, about how this can be 
accom plished, if the aim is the creation of a free trade area, the APEC leaders declared that 
they  will "give particular attention" to  "trade w ith  non-APEC developing countries to  
ensure th a t they will also benefit."
H ow ever ambiguous and distant, as is the achievem ent of free trade in the year 
2 0 2 0 , just setting this goal is a major step for a grouping th a t represents alm ost 5 0  
percent of the w orld 's gross dom estic product.
Setting the goal is also impressive. APEC w as only established in 1 9 8 9 , in 
Canberra, Australia, as a loose association among Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, 
N ew  Zealand, the United S tates and the six m em bers of the Association of East Asian  
Nations (ASEAN)--Brunei, Indonesia, M alaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. It 
has grown to 18 m embers w ith  the admission, in 1 9 9 1 , of China, Hong Kong, and Chinese 
Taipei; of M exico and Papua N ew  Guinea in 1 9 9 3 ; and finally Chile, adm itted during the  
Seattle  sum m it. Probably in recognition of this rapid grow th in m em bership, a fter Chile's 
admission, new  admissions w ere  closed for the next three years.
APEC is also evolving rapidly in the institutional domain. To the annual m eetings of 
foreign and econom ic ministers have been added other meetings of ministers in charge of 
trade, of transportation, of finance, and of small and medium enterprises. Starting in 
Seattle , the sum m it of APEC leaders has now  convened for the second consecutive year 
and it can be expected to  m eet again next year in Japan. APEC's chair rotates annually 
and it convenes the annual ministerial m eeting. A fter Japan, the next ministerial meetings  
will be held in Philippines (1 9 9 6 ) , Canada (1 9 9 7 ) and M alaysia (1 9 9 8 ).
Since Septem ber 1 9 9 2 , a perm anent secretariat for APEC w as established in 
Singapore. Until 1 January 1 9 9 6 , the secretariat's recurrent expenditures, such as 
salaries and allow ances of locally-recruited s ta ff, utility charges, and charges for the
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m aintenance of buildings and office equipm ent, will be borne by the governm ent of 
Singapore. Thus, the sixth ministerial m eeting, held in Jakarta a fe w  days before the last 
APEC sum m it, decided to  form a task force to  exam ine the secretariat's  future.
APEC's ministerial m eeting oversees the functioning of ten working groups and tw o  
com m ittees. The working groups cover a w ide range of topics: trade and investm ent data; 
trade promotion; industrial science and technology; human resource developm ent; energy  
cooperation; marine resource conservation; telecom m unications; transportation; tourism  
and fisheries. The tw o  com m ittees deal w ith  trade and investm ent and econom ic trends  
and issues. In Jakarta , the last ministerial meeting decided to  transform  the last into an 
econom ic com m ittee and added tw o  subcom m ittees on standards and conform ance and on 
custom s procedures to  the trade and investm ent com m ittee. A lso, the ministers created a 
budget and adm inistrative com m ittee, approved a budget for 1 9 9 5  of $ 2 ,2 2 7 ,7 3 2 ,  and 
agreed th a t, next year, they  will review  m em bers' contributions.
Finally, the APEC leaders asked the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), w ho drafted the  
trade liberalization proposal, and the Pacific Business Forum of private sector 
representatives, to  "continue w ith  their activities to  provide the APEC economic leaders 
w ith  assessments of the progress of APEC and further recom m endations for stepping up 
our cooperation."
In this m anner, the distant and ambiguous goal of achieving free trade by the year 
2 0 2 0  becomes credible, considering the intense levels of interdependence that exist w ithin  
the APEC and their rapid pace of institutionalization.
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II. THE U.S. ECONOMY
11.1. MORE OF THE SAM E IN 1 9 9 4  
(W D W /1 /9 4  19  January 1 9 9 4 )
Based on the strong perform ance of the U .S . econom y during the last quarter of 9 3 ,  
there exists w ide consensus betw een governm ent and private econom ists th a t 1 9 9 4  will 
see a t least a repetition of last year's results. According to  Treasury Secretary Lloyd 
Bentsen, in 1 9 9 3 , "GDP w e n t from 0 .8  percent first quarter, to  1 .9  percent second 
quarter, to  2 .9  percent third quarter, and I think w e 'll see a stronger fourth q u a rte r-  
something betw een 4  and 5 percent."
The expectation for 9 4  is th a t GDP will attain  3 percent real grow th  and that 
inflation w ill remain a t approxim ately 3 percent. These results, according to  Secretary  
Bentsen, "should allow  interest rates to  remain relatively low  and reduce further the rate of 
unem ploym ent."
Private forecasters agree w ith  these projections. According to  the semiannual 
survey carried out by The W all S treet Journal among 51 econom ists, "w hen comparing all 
of 9 4  w ith  the year just ended . . . the grow th rate comes in slightly better at 3 % ."
Even some of the adm inistration's most severe critics are also in agreem ent. Former 
chairperson of President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers and Harvard Professor 
M artin S. Feldstein, adm itted to  The N ew  York Tim es th a t "it is hard to complain too loudly 
about an econom y th a t is growing at an annual rate of 2 .5  percent or better, has a 6 .4  
percent unem ploym ent rate and inflation of only about 3 percent." H ow ever, he added, 
the "high marks" for such perform ance should go to  the Republican-appointed chairperson  
of the Federal Reserve Board Alan Greenspan.
For these positive projections to  hold, there exists agreem ent th a t inflation should 
remain low , accom panied by m oderate economic grow th and low  interest rates. How ever, 
most of the economists surveyed in the Journal agree th a t, if the strength of last year's  
fourth quarter continues into this year's first quarter, the Federal Reserve will raise short­
term  interest rates "as a pre-em ptive strike against inflation."
Even so, among private investors, this expectation of higher short-term  interest 
rates in the near future has not influenced their propensity to  invest in the stock m arket. 
According to  a poll of 5 ,0 0 0  Paine W ebber brokerage custom ers, reported in The W all 
Street Journal, "m ost individual investors expect interest rates to  spike up this year--yet 
6 8 %  of them  plan to  buy stocks soon and are counting on fa t returns."
A  key indicator to  w atch  is the rate of unem ploym ent. Presently, a t 6.1 percent, 
unem ploym ent is seen by Professor Feldstein "as close as the nation can com e to full 
em ploym ent w ithout triggering a dangerous new  round of inflation."
14
The reply cam e im m ediately from Professor Alan S. Blinder, a m em ber of President 
Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers. "W e definitely don 't accept t h a t . . . the  
unem ploym ent rate could descend com fortably to  5 .5  percent w ithout igniting inflation."
For some observers, the administration is trying to  remain in the center, facing the  
pressures of those pushing for more spending and those w ho  favor the preem ptive strike 
against inflation, by increasing short-term  interest rates.
Not everything is assured. Som e observers see several yellow  lights in the horizon. 
By the end of the year, oil prices are expected to  increase m oderately to  $ 1 6  a barrel, from  
the present level of less than $ 1 4  a barrel. A lso, the e ffec t of the tax  increase on the  
w ealth y  is estim ated that will be fe lt in the form of reduced spending during the second 
and third quarters. Th irty of the 51 forecasters surveyed, for instance, believed the tax  
increase will have a "significant" e ffec t on the econom y. Finally, during the fourth quarter 
of this year, GDP grow th in the United S tates is projected to  reach 3 percent, assuming 
th a t exports to  W estern  Europe regain their strength, essentially as a consequence of the  
expected reactivation of the German econom y.
H ow ever, other observers doubt th a t the reactivation of the German and the  
Japanese econom ies will com e in tim e to generate an increase in U .S . exports.
M eanw hile , the United S tates, in Secretary Bentsen's term s, remains "the w orld 's  
economic leader -- the engine of grow th in the w orld."
For instance, a comparison of unit labor costs in m anufacturing reveals th a t, at 
current exchange rates, U .S . workers cost $ 1 6 .7 0  an hour, Japanese $ 1 9 .3 0  and Germans 
$ 2 5 .5 0 . For David W essel, in The W all S treet Journal, "the U .S . has been working out at 
the health club for the past couple of years. And it has paid off. Germ any and Japan have 
just finished a big lunch and are only now  signing up at the local economic g ym .” More 
bluntly, M IT  Professor Rudiger Dornbusch sees Germ any as "overw eight and overpaid."
Briefly, the prediction of a continuation of present trends this year in the U .S . 
econom y is based on the persistence of low  inflation, w hich will allow for interest rates to  
remain at the present low levels. This trend m ay obtain a little help from abroad if oil 
prices remain at their present low  levels. It is also expected that the beginning of the  
reactivation in Germ any and Japan by year's end will boost U .S . exports.
II .2 . THE ECO NO M IC STATE OF THE UNION  
(W D W /6 /9 4  2 3  February 1 9 9 4 )
Skeptics w ho still doubt if there has been change in the direction of U .S . economic  
policy should take a close look at President's Clinton Economic Report, sent to Congress 
on 14  February 1 9 9 4 . In the letter of transmission to  the Congress, President 
Clinton asserts th a t "for 12 years a policy of trickle-dow n economics built a false 
prosperity on a mountain of debt."
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In response to the demand for change, the President spells out "a comprehensive  
short-term  and long-term strategy" of "renewal and reform " to  "restore grow th in the living 
standards of all Am ericans." This strategy is based on the following elem ents: 1) deficit 
reduction, or "laying the m acroeconom ic groundwork for sustained grow th ," is described 
as the "governm ent's first responsibility;" 2) investm ent, because "Governm ent also has a 
vital role to  play in providing some of the critical raw  m aterials for econom ic g row th ," such 
as science and technology, an educated and well-trained w ork  force, and public 
infrastructure; 3) reform of the health care system , to  confront "a health care crisis that 
dem ands a solution, both for the health of our citizens and for the health of our econom y  
over the long run;" 4 ) to  open foreign m arkets to  U .S . exports, to  adapt to  an integrated  
world econom y and because "export industries offer the kind of h igh-w age, high-skill jobs 
the country needs;" 5) to  improve the effic iency of the federal governm ent, or "to reinvent 
how  the governm ent perform s."
To carry out this strategy the President foresees a m oderately positive economic  
outlook. Therefore, "the Adm inistration forecasts th a t the econom y will grow  a t 3  percent 
in 1 9 9 4  and will remain on track  to  create 8  million jobs over 4  years."
The annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), th a t fo llow s the  
President's m essage of transmission to  Congress, expands on each one of the strategy's  
elem ents mentioned above and it is divided in the following chapters: 1 ) a strategy for 
grow th and change; 2) the U .S . econom y in 1 9 9 3  and beyond; 3) trends and recent 
developm ents in the U. S. labor m arket; 4 ) health care reform; 5) m icroeconom ic initiatives  
to  prom ote effic iency and productivity; and 6) the United S tates in the world econom y.
The first chapter links w h a t is characterized as "the legacy of the past" w ith  the  
strategy of econom ic change to overcom e the legacy. Am ong the challenges confronted  
are, first, "the recovery th a t began in the second quarter of 1991 has been exceptionally  
slow  by historical standards--so slow , in fac t, that the unem ploym ent rate w as  still rising 
more than a year into the 'recovery .'"  The second challenge, of a longer-term nature, is 
the "troubling fac t th a t grow th in productivity has been anemic for the last tw o  decades." 
Finally, since the late 1 9 7 0 s  "income inequalities w idened alarm ingly." On top of these  
cam e large fiscal and trade deficits, w ith  high interest rates, dollar overvaluation and a 
shortage of public investm ent.
To overcom e this legacy, the econom ic strategy of the Clinton Adm inistration aims 
at "reducing the deficit to promote capital form ation," investing in people, in public 
infrastructure, and in technology, implementing health care reform and opening m arkets to  
U.S. exports.
Based on the perform ance of 1 9 9 3 , the CEA sees the U. S. econom y overcoming 
some of the "headwinds" th a t w ere slowing down the recovery. For instance, "the credit 
crunch is fading," while "the other industrial countries will not remain mired in recession 
forever" and com m ercial construction "has also started to  im prove." There is only one 
exception to  this positive outlook, defense cutbacks "seem alm ost certain to  continue over 
the rest of the decade."
Therefore, "a credible deficit reduction plan and low  long-term interest rates have 
set the stage for m oderate but sustainable economic grow th over the m id -1 9 9 0 s ."  The
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Adm inistration's forecast is th a t "GDP grow th of 2  1 /2  to  3 percent per year--in line w ith  
1 9 9 3  g ro w th -seem s likely to  continue over the rest of the 19 9 0 s ."
This m oderately positive outlook will sustain the im plem entation of m icroeconomic  
initiatives to  "improve w orker productivity and increase earnings," to  promote  
technological progress, to  address environmental externalities and to  create a more 
effective  governm ent. A  prominent part of this package is com prehensive health care 
reform , based on the conviction th a t "piecemeal approaches. . .w ill not w ork ." This 
proposal has already become one of the most controversial initiatives of the present 
Adm inistration.
Finally, all these changes will have to  take place in a world econom y w here the  
United S tates, in President Clinton's term s must "com pete not retreat." The  
Adm inistration "understands th a t expanding trade relations are not only inevitable but 
critical to  the future health of the U .S . econom y. It is determ ined to  ensure th a t the  
growing interdependence w ith  our trading partners brings benefits to the United S tates."  
For this purpose, the CEA forcefully concludes, "the United S tates Governm ent is 
com m itted to  act unilaterally, bilaterally, regionally, p lurilateral^ , and globally to open 
m arkets to  maintain the ability of U .S . firms to com pete around the w orld."
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III. THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
III.1 . PROSPECTS
(W D W /1 5 /9 4  1 June 1 9 9 4 )
The recent perform ance of the developing economies has been uneven and it will 
remain so in the next decade, concludes the latest W orld Bank's Global Economic 
Prospects and the Developing Economies. Released by the International Economics 
D epartm ent, the analysis w as  prepared for the forthcoming W orld Developm ent Report. 
Besides describing the prospects for the developing econom ies, the report deals w ith  the  
specific issue of international trade in com m odities, as did the first of these reports, 
released four years ago.
The study has three parts: 1 ) global conditions and prospects for the  developing 
countries; 2) does dependence on primary com m odities mean slow er grow th?, and 3) 
com m odity price volatility: high, costly, and a challenge to  m anage.
The unevenness in the perform ance of the developing econom ies is attributed to  the  
declines in output experienced by the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia and by the negative grow th  in income per capita experienced by the econom ies of 
Sub-Saharan A frica. By contrast, "despite recession and slow  output expansion in the  
major industrial countries, grow th  of GDP and exports accelerated in Asia and Latin 
Am erica."
Based on the assumption th a t economic recovery in the United S tates  w ill spread to  
the rest of the Group of Seven (G -7) countries, the projection is that "m ost developing 
countries can on balance expect a m arked im provem ent in the international economic 
environm ent over the coming decade." Thus, the forecast "focuses on five channels 
through w hich impulses in the global econom y tend to  be transm itted to developing 
countries-econom ic activ ity  in industrial countries, inflation and interest rates, capital 
flow s, com m odity prices, and world trade."
An average of 2 .7  percent grow th a year is projected for the high-income OECD  
countries in the coming decade, w hich "remains low in comparison to past trends." 
H ow ever, "the negative e ffec ts  this m ay have on the export prospects of developing 
countries are likely to  be o ffset by four other favorable developm ents." First, "international 
interest rates are likely to  remain low  in the w ake of continued fiscal consolidation in major 
industrial countries." Second, "the record surge in private capital flow s to  creditw orthy  
middle-income developing countries will be sustained." Third, world trade will experience  
high grow th , because of the Uruguay Round and the North Am erican Free Trade  
A greem ent (N A FTA ). Finally, real com m odity prices are expected to  stabilize.
In these conditions, the perform ance of individual developing regions will diverge.
For instance, "barring any major political upheaval. East Asia is likely to  remain the fastest 
growing developing region over the next decade, but its performance will probably be less 
spectacular than in the past, partly as a result of infrastructural and environmental 
constraints." For East Asia, the baseline forecast projects annual grow th of real GDP of
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7 .6  percent. By contrast, in South Asia, "grow th prospects for the coming decade will 
depend on the spread and intensification of its reform s."
In Latin Am erica, "the grow th rate is likely to  accelerate m odestly, depending in part 
on the deepening of reforms and continued capital flow s," w ith  the baseline forecast 
projecting real GDP grow th of 3 .4  percent. "A key concern underlying the grow th  
projections for Latin Am erica is the sustainability of private capital flow s. The assumption  
is th a t these flow s will subside as a share of GDP but will continue to  be fairly large for 
several more years."
The outlook in Sub-Saharan Africa is "sobering," because it can "improve its 
econom ic perform ance in the coming decade; nevertheless, average per-capita incomes 
and consumption are unlikely to  increase significantly, and the number of poor is expected  
to  increase both in absolute term s and as a proportion of the population."
The developing countries of Europe and Central Asia "remain the m ost uncertain of 
all: although m arket oriented reforms appear to be generating positive results in some 
countries, great uncertainties remain about the direction and speed of reform s in others." 
Finally, in the Middle East and North Africa "the outlook for the next decade is brighter -- in 
part because of the potential peace dividend -- but is fraught w ith  a high degree of 
uncertainty."
H ow ever, a "low -case scenario" is based on the impossibility by the industrialized 
countries of "overcoming structural im pedim ents to  grow th and in maintaining low  inflation  
and interest rates." This less favorable scenario "would a ffec t countries in Latin Am erica  
currently receiving large capital inflows, as well as low  income com m odity producers in 
Sub-Saharan A frica." For Latin Am erica, the low -case scenario projects grow th in real GDP 
of 0 .8  percent, because "exposure to higher interest rates and reduced capital flow s, 
combined to  less responsive exports, requires major import compression and stops 
grow th ." Thus, "the downside risk in grow th (relative to  the forecast) is larger than the  
upside, reflecting the underlying asym m etry of risks on interest rates and capital flow s."
By contrast, East Asian countries "are likely to show the greatest resistance." The  
projected grow th of real GDP for East Asia in the low-case scenario is of 7.1 percent.
III.2 . C O M M O D IT Y  DEPENDENCE A N D  ECONOM IC DEVELOPMENT  
(W D W /1 6 /9 4  8 June 1 9 9 4 )
It is highly significant th a t this year's Global Economic Prospects and the  
Developing Economies 1 9 9 4  (W D W /1 5 /9 4 ) ,  produced by the International Economics 
D epartm ent of the W orld Bank, revisits the issue of international trade in com m odities. 
Besieged for some tim e by an impressive set of bad new s, the Bank tries to  identify some 
good new s from the bleak performance and outlook of world com m odity m arkets.
The bad new s is that "the 1 9 8 0 s  w ere crisis years for com m odity exporters."
Thus, "the estim ated annual loss to  developing countries from  the fall in com m odity prices 
betw een 1 9 8 0  and 1 9 9 3  reached U S $ 1 0 0  billion a year in 1 9 9 3  -- or more than tw ic e  the  
flow  aid in 1 9 9 0 ."  The Bank's "index for real non-oil com m odity prices," measuring
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"relative com m odity prices vis-a-vis m anufactures," fell by one half to  the low est point 
since 1 9 4 5 . "Betw een 1 9 7 9  and 1 9 9 2 , real com m odity prices virtually collapsed -- 
beverage prices fell by 7 4  percent, cereals by 4 4  percent, oils and fa ts  by 5 7  percent, logs 
by 2 4  percent, and m etals and minerals by 3 6  percent."
W orst still, "com m odity exporters have been underachievers for longer than just the  
1 9 8 0 s ."  Compared to those of all developing countries, average GDP grow th rates for 
com m odity exporters in the 19 6 0 s  w ere  below  by 1 .7  percent in the 19 6 0 s , 2 .3  percent in 
the 19 7 0 s  and 1 .8  percent in the 19 8 0 s .
The evidence reveals th a t "non-oil com m odity exporters w ere particularly 
unfortunate in the 1 9 8 0 s ."  These "underachievers" experienced term s of trade shocks 
that "reduced their real incom es by an average of 5 percent of GDP, w ith  larger declines in 
countries such as Cote d 'Ivoire (6  percent), Uganda (7 percent), Costa Rica (9 percent), 
Cameroon (11 percent), and Togo (1 3  percent)."
So much for the bad new s, the good new s is that there exist some outstanding  
exam ples th a t "com m odity exporters can also be successful in maintaining high grow th."  
Chile "expanded its fruit exports dram atically in the 1 9 8 0 s ."  Betw een 1 9 7 4  and 1 9 9 0 , 
Chilean "exports of fresh fru it grew  a t an astonishing 25  percent per year. The share of 
fresh fruit in Chile's to tal exports rose to  10  percent by the late 1 9 8 0 s , w ith  annual export 
revenues exceeding U S $ 5 0 0  million." Also, "the fastest growing country in the world in 
the 1 9 7 0 s  and 1 9 8 0 s "  w as  Botsw ana, "a small country in Sub-Saharan A frica , w here GDP 
grew  by an annual 1 4 .5  percent in 1 9 7 0 -8 0  and slowed to  a breathtaking 9 .8  percent in 
1 9 8 0 -9 1 ."  Botswana is "the quintessential com m odity exporting econom y, relying for 8 0  
percent of its export revenues on one com m odity. It helps, of course, w hen that 
com m odity is uncut diam onds." Equally spectacular increases w ere achieved by Malaysian  
exports of palm oil and cocoa; Thailand 's exports of shrimp; and Brazilian exports of frozen  
concentrated orange juice.
H ow ever, "a high share of com m odities in total output or exports does not 
necessarily condemn a country to  low  grow th ." Unfortunately, no exam ples exist of 
countries that "have grow n slow ly and still substantially lowered the share of primary 
com m odities in total exports. In fac t, on the basis of data for eighty-seven countries, there 
appears to be a clear relationship betw een  economic grow th and the decline in dependence 
on primary exports."
Still, 2 9  out 4 9  countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and 18 of 3 8  Latin Am erican  
countries "depend on primary com m odities for more than 5 0  percent of their export 
earnings." Furthermore, "the major m arkets for most of these com m odity producers are 
the industrial countries. S even ty -tw o  percent of the w orld 's com m odity exports are 
bought by the industrial nations, more or less in proportion to  their share in world GDP and 
world imports of m anufactures."
The industrialized countries "account for about half of the w orld 's exports of 
primary com m odities," and these same countries "account for tw o-th irds of agricultural 
exports." For instance, the industrial countries dominate the world m arket of "tim ber (62  
percent), fish (65  percent), vegetables (67  percent) energy exports (7 3  percent), tubers (75  
percent), cereals (8 0  percent), sugar (65  percent), and dairy products (89  percent)." By
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contrast, the developing countries predominate in "tobacco (6 0  percent), sugar (65  
percent), coffee , cocoa, and tea (80  percent), and rubber (9 0  percent)."
In some com m odities w here the developing countries dom inate, such as co ffee , 
cocoa, and tea , there is the "adding up" problem, w hereby export expansion lowers world  
prices. Due to  the inelasticity of dem and, "an increase or a decrease in the supply of a 
com m odity leads to  a larger percentage change in its price." H ow ever, even w here the  
"adding-up" problem is present, "policies promoting effic iency in production, processing, 
and m arketing are likely to  achieve more lasting im provem ents in net revenues than  
curtailing production through export quotas or taxes."
Finally, "w here a group of com m odity exporters jointly w ields significant m arket 
pow er, imposing export quotas or a uniform export tax  could raise the w elfare  of each  
m em ber of the group -- the exam ple of OPEC shows that such w elfare  gains can be 
substantial. But similar attem pts  for other com m odities other than oil have proved less 
successful, largely because it is difficult to  coordinate restrictions on supplies among 
producers w ith  diverse interests."
III.3 . C O M M O D IT Y  PRICE V O LA TIL ITY  
(W D W /1 7 /9 4  15 June 1 9 9 4 )
O f all the difficulties th a t characterize the performance of com m odities in the world  
econom y, no other stands out as the volatility of com m odity prices. In recognition, this 
issue merits a separate chapter in the last report released by the W orld Bank's International 
Economics D epartm ent on the Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 
1 9 9 4  (W D W /1 6 /9 4 ) .
The prices of primary comm odities "are notoriously volatile," for several reasons. 
Because of "unanticipated w eather disturbances," that a ffec t the production of food and 
beverages; the "long gestation betw een new  planting and production," th a t characterizes  
tropical beverages; or due to "unforeseen, usually cyclical, changes in industrial demand  
th a t cause the "high price variability" of m etals. A n yw ay , "com m odity prices in the  
aggregate have typically been much more volatile than prices of m anufactures."
Because of price volatility, exporters of primary com m odities experience "revenue  
instability" and "farm ers and workers suffer variability in incom es," w hile "governm ents  
find th a t their fiscal position and foreign exchange reserves change substantially over short 
periods as a result of a sudden change in international prices."
Evidence reveals th a t "the degree of volatility has differed greatly over tim e." For 
instance, during the 19 7 0 s , turbulence in com m odity prices, "w ith  tw o  oil shocks and a 
range of severe m acroeconom ic disturbances affecting the prices of all com m odities," 
resulted in "a level of volatility not seen since the interw ar period."
The Report also shows that "w hen export prices or export earnings of a country are 
unstable, it is highly probable that incomes and consumption are unstable. The correlation  
betw een the volatility of export revenues and the volatility of private consumption is
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positive and high." For instance, betw een  1961 and 1 9 9 2 , losses in income due to  price 
volatility am ounted to  2 0  percent for Malaysian tin producers, 15 percent for Brazilian 
coffee grow ers, and 6  percent for Egyptian cotton farm ers.
Direct losses caused by falls in com m odity prices result in a "decline in export 
revenues." Indirect costs are reflected in depressed exchange rates th a t cause a "shift of 
productive resources from nontraded to  traded goods production." By contrast, an abrupt 
com m odity price increase w ill cause a costly shift "back to  the production of nontraded- 
goods sectors." Also, volatility in com m odity prices generates "uncertainty, making long­
term  investm ents riskier and complicating the task of m acroeconomic m anagem ent."
More relevant is th a t "com m odity exporters are subject to  bigger shocks than are 
other countries." Therefore, "it is not unusual for developing countries to  experience 
shocks th a t exceed 4  percent of G DP." As did Brazil, "suffering negative shocks 
equivalent to  4  percent of GDP in 1981  and 1 9 8 2  from a combination of com m odity price 
declines, reduction in world trade volum es, and rises in interest rates."
Another casualty of com m odity price volatility is investm ent, w hich "invariably 
declines more than consumption w hen countries experience a sharp deterioration in their 
term s of trade." For exam ple, in eighteen oil-exporting economies "a sustained decline of 
1 percent in the term s of trade w as  found to  low er investm ent spending by 0 .6  percent, a 
much larger decline than the 0 .3 5  percent for consumption."
All these reasons "m ake the m anagem ent of com m odity price risk an im portant 
challenge for exporters." The conclusion is th a t "nonm arket schem es, such as 
com pensatory financing, international com m odity agreem ents, and dom estic price 
stabilization schem es, have m et w ith  limited success." By contrast, "m arket based 
techniques, notably com m odity-linked financial instrum ents, appear to  offer new  
opportunities and approaches for managing com m odity price risk."
The Report reveals th a t "the use of com m odity-linked financial instrum ents as a 
m eans of hedging risk is growing rapidly." There is enough evidence available of the  
successful use by several developing countries of financial instrum ents, such as forw ard, 
futures, options and sw aps, to  protect their export revenues. For instance, the Mexican oil 
com pany has used futures contracts to  protect its crude oil export earnings, and coffee  
exporters in Brazil, Costa Rica and El Salvador have also used futures contracts to  protect 
them selves from the risk of price variability. Only one exam ple of a "disastrous situation" 
is m entioned. To illustrate th a t "some risks rem ain," the Report m entions "the loss of 
more than U S $ 2 0 0  million experienced by CODELCO in late 1 9 9 3 ."
H ow ever, the question remains of "w hy is the use of m arket-based financial 
instrum ents not more w idespread among developing countries?" Among the reasons are 
lack of fam iliarity w ith  their advantages; adverse governm ent policies; absence of 
instrum ents w ith  longer m aturity  than tw o  years; and difficulties in locating appropriate 
instrum ents. To "help developing countries better m anage com m odity price exposure 
through the use of com m odity-linked financial instrum ents," the W orld Bank has started a 
technical assistance program, in Algeria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nigeria, M exico , Trinidad 
and Tobago, and Venezuela.
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III.4 . GOVERNANCE
(W D W /2 0 /9 4  6 July 1 9 9 4 )
Developm ent activities are characterized by certain catchw ords th a t become 
dom inant throughout distinctive periods. For instance, a t the W orld Bank, "basic needs" 
dom inated during the M cNam ara years, as "structural adjustm ent" characterized the  
decade of the eighties. Perhaps it is a bit prem ature to  identify the catchw ord of the  
nineties, but in the present W orld Bank's agenda "governance" already m ay be gaining the  
upper hand.
H ow  these catchw ords, th a t dom inate the W orld Bank's agenda, end up becoming 
part of the global developm ent agenda is fairly simple. The W orld Bank is rapidly becoming 
the agenda setter in the developm ent field, because it is the single main source of 
developm ent finance, far ahead of individual bilateral agencies and of the commercial 
banks.
Furthermore, other official and private developm ent agencies, regardless if they  
accept it or reject it, recognize this agenda-setting role of the multilateral financial 
institutions (M FIs). Therefore, these catchw ords are more than fads, they becom e relevant 
because they are part of the lending program of the agenda-setting developm ent 
institution.
For this reason, the release of a study on Governance: The W orld Bank's 
Experience, reviewing recent lending activities in this field, should not pass unnoticed.
Even if only tw o  years have passed since the Bank published its first report on Governance  
and D evelopm ent, "the record shows th a t the Bank's w ork on governance has greatly  
expanded."
For instance, "in fiscal 1 9 9 3 , total lending classified as PSM (public sector 
m anagem ent) w as U S $ 6 0 9  million." This still represents a relatively small percentage of 
total lending of around U S $ 2 5  billion per year. Even so, an analysis of 4 5 5  developm ent 
projects, executed during the 1991 to 1 9 9 3  fiscal period, revealed that "governance topics 
pervade W orld Bank lending operations," as a major com ponent. Out of all these lending 
operations 68  percent included decentralization and capacity building, 4 9  percent 
comprised economic m anagem ent and about one third had an influence on the reform of 
state-ow ned enterprises.
The Bank understands by governance "the manner in w hich pow er is exercised in 
the m anagem ent of a country's economic and social resources for developm ent." This is 
an essentially political concept, because of the centrality of pow er in its definition. 
H ow ever,"the W orld Bank draw s a clear distinction betw een the concept's political and 
econom ic dimensions."
Formally, the Bank recalls, its "Articles of A greem ent explicitly prohibit the  
institution from interfering in a country's internal political affairs and require it to  take only 
econom ic considerations into account in its decisions." Thus, "the Bank's call for good 
governance and its concern w ith  accountability, transparency, and the rule of law  have to
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do exclusively w ith  the contribution they m ake to  social and econom ic developm ent and to  
the Bank's fundam ental objective of sustainable poverty reduction in the developing  
world."
H ow ever, despite this rather artificial separation betw een  the econom ic and social 
from the political, the report em ploys four essentially political "subheadings" to  describe 
the Bank's activities in governance: 1) public sector m anagem ent (PSM); 2) accountability;
3) legal fram ew ork for developm ent; and 4 ) transparency and inform ation.
Public sector m anagem ent, the first of these four subheadings, "is the m ost readily 
identified dimension of the Bank's governance w ork ." This is based on the "conviction  
th a t an effic ient governm ent is a sine qua non for sustainable economic grow th ." The  
other three dimensions "underpin PSM ," w hich traditionally has covered "categories such 
as civil service reform , public expenditure m anagem ent, and public enterprise reform ."
A vow edly , the "emphasis on PSM has been influenced by changing perceptions in 
the role of the s ta te ." Nonetheless, contrary to  some com m only held assumptions, the  
Objective is not circumscribed to  the simplistic reduction of the state . This "new  model 
requires a smaller state equipped w ith  a professional, accountable bureaucracy th a t can 
provide an 'enabling environm ent' for private sector led grow th ." It is also a state  
characterized by the capacity to  "discharge effectively  core functions," such as 
"m acroeconom ic m anagem ent, selective intervention, greater use of indirect m eans for the  
delivery of public services, and a capacity to  regulate w here private providers enjoy a 
m onopoly." All these as instrum ents "to pursue sustained poverty reduction."
Finally, the report also describes "other issues that are related to Bank activities," 
such as participatory approaches to  policy making and im plem entation, m ilitary  
expenditures and human rights. The promise is that in the future the Bank's activities on 
governance will also "underscore the im portance of institutions in the developm ent 
process." In the coming years, among the "central objectives of the Bank's econom ic and 
sector w ork" will be "how  to  assist countries in building strong institutions and to explore 
further the relationship betw een institutional developm ent, public sector m anagem ent, and 
the other dimensions of governance."
III .5. IN S T ITU TIO N S  A N D  DEVELOPMENT  
(W D W /2 4 /9 4  7 Septem ber 1 9 9 4 )
Until the Nobel Prize in econom ics w as granted to  Ronald Coase in 1991 and to  
Douglass North in 1 9 9 3 , it could be safely said that "institutions" w ere among the  
"poorest relatives" of the discipline, a lw ays coming last and given the least attention.
As it can be recalled, this residual nature of institutions in economics w as pervasive 
throughout the different shades of econom ic theory. For instance, a t the m ost, some 
thought th a t institutions becam e necessary in instances of m arket failure. Even M arxists  
w ere no exception, institutions w ere  part of a "superstructure" determ ined by the  
underlying interplay of the alm ighty "forces of production."
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Today's  recognition of the role of institutions in developm ent m anifests itself in 
w h at is known as the "N ew  Institutional Economics" (NIE). The term  w as coined by 
University of California, Berkeley Professor Oliver E. W illiam son some tw e n ty  years ago, 
but it gained full recognition only recently.
For instance, R.H. Coase's Nobel acceptance lecture, titled "the institutional 
structure of production," describes his seminal articles on "the nature of the firm " and "the 
problem of social cost" as aimed at clarifying how  transaction costs are affected  by the  
legal system .
Also, Douglass C. North's Nobel lecture titled "economic perform ance through  
tim e," describes how  economic history, or the study of how  economies develop, needs to  
focus on the evolution of institutions, understood as the incentive structure of society.
Even this year's  W orld Bank Annual Conference on Developm ent Economics, held 
last April, in W ashington, D .C ., had a special segm ent dedicated to  the "new  institutional 
econom ics." This portion of the conference included presentations by Professor 0 .  
Williamson on "institutions and economic organization" and by University of Chicago  
Professor Jon Elster on "the im pact of constitutions on economic perform ance."
W h at are some characteristics of the "new  institutional economics"?
First, the NIE does not aim at the construction of some global, comprehensive  
analytic fram ew ork. This is in accordance w ith  Elster's assertion th a t "explanations in the 
social sciences should be organized around (partial) m echanisms rather than (general) 
theories." W illiam son points out tha t, in this m anner, "hypothetical ideals give w a y  to the 
com parative analysis of alternative feasible form s." In W illiam son's term s, instead of 
declaring "this is the law  here," the purpose is more m odestly characterized as to  discern 
"w hat is going on here?"
Second, therefore, instead of proceeding from the top dow n, the NIE follow s a 
"bottom -up" approach, "mainly concerned w ith  "the m icroanalytic logic of economic  
organization." The purpose is "that the transaction be made the basic unit of analysis," 
which "shifts the attention aw ay  from the orthodox focus on price and output to  consider 
the attributes of transactions." Additionally, "because institutions do not, as it w ere , 
speak for them selves, a lens is needed. That is w here and w h y transaction cost 
econom ics comes in."
Third, by contrast to  "the older institutional econom ics," that according to Coase 
only had "a stance of hostility to  the standard economic theory," W illiam son asserts that 
"the NIE bears a mainly com plem entary relationship to  orthodoxy." Even so, "there are 
also real differences" betw een them . "The neoclassical concept of the firm-as-production  
function, for exam ple, has gradually given w ay  to  or made w a y  for the idea of the firm-as- 
governance structure." Other examples of differences given by W illiam son are th a t "the 
study of economic organization is v iew ed less in technological/production cost and more in 
com parative contracting/transaction costs." Briefly, Coase says "w hat distinguishes the
modern institutional economists" is th a t "they use standard economic theory to analyze the 
working of these institutions and to  discover the part they play in the operation of the  
econom y."
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Fourth, W illiamson describes how  the NIE has developed in tw o  com plem entary  
parts. As defined by Lance Davis and Douglass North, this tw o -part definition comprises:
1) "the institutional environm ent," understood as the set of fundam ental, political, 
social and legal ground rules th a t established the basis for production, exchange and 
distribution. Rules governing elections, property rights, and the right of contract are 
exam ples.
2) "an institutional arrangem ent," understood as "an arrangem ent betw een  
econom ic units th a t governs the w ays in w hich these units can cooperate and/or 
com pete."
Finally, quoting Coase, W illiam son adds the individual, as a third level. "Modern  
institutional econom ics, concludes Coase, should study man as he is, acting w ith in  the  
constraints imposed by real institutions."
To conclude, according to  Kenneth A rrow , "the N ew  Institutional Economics 
m o v e m e n t. . . does not consist primarily of giving answers to the traditional questions of 
economics -  resource allocation and the degree of utilization. Rather it consists of 
answering new  questions, w h y  econom ic institutions have emerged the w a y  they did and 
not o therw ise." As Coase says, "modern institutional economics is econom ics as it ought 
to be."
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IV. CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IV . 1. TRENDS
(W D W /2 /9 4  2 6  January 1 9 9 4 )
It is a sign of the tim es that M ichael Bruno, W orld Bank's Chief Economist and Vice  
President of Developm ent Economics, recognized a t the presentation of this year's  W orld  
Debt Tables 1 9 9 3 -9 4 , th a t it will be necessary next year to  issue this publication w ith  a 
new  title . The subtitle of this year's tw o  volum es, released on Decem ber 15 , 1 9 9 3 , is 
external finance for developing countries. This am ounts to a recognition th a t the issue of 
the indebtedness of developing countries has in great measure becom e, for some of these  
countries, a m atter of access to  international capital m arkets.
The contents of the Tables' first volume recognize this turn of events. Part I covers 
first, financial flow s to  developing countries and second, developm ents and trends in 
external debt. Part II contains a special feature dedicated to  trends in foreign direct 
investm ent for developing countries and Part III presents sum m ary statistical tables for 
selected regional and analytical groups comprising 1 4 8  developing countries.
Volum e tw o  contains statistical tables showing the external debt of each of the 129  
countries th a t report public and publicly guaranteed debt under the Debtor Reporting 
System  (DRS), maintained by the s ta ff of the Debt and International Finance Division of the  
Bank's International Economics Departm ent.
Here are some of the highlights contained in the first volume of Analysis and Sum m ary  
Tables:
1 ) By the end of 1 9 9 3 , the debt of all developing countries is projected to rise to  
U S $ 1 ,7 7 0  billion, an increase of 6 .5  percent from the $ 1 ,6 6 2  it reached at the end of
1 9 9 2 .
2) For all the developing countries, the debt-to-exports ratio is projected to increase 
in 1 9 9 3  to  1 8 0  percent, from  1 7 4  percent in 1 9 9 2 , w hile the debt service-to-exports ratio 
is expected to remain unchanged at around 19 percent.
3) Total debt stocks owed by Latin Am erica and the Caribbean, in 1 9 9 3 , are 
expected to  increase slightly, by 3 .4  percent, to  $ 5 1 2 .9  billion, from $ 4 9 6 .2 . These  
stocks represent 4 0 .8  percent of GNP, dow n from 4 1 .7  percent in 1 9 9 2 , or 2 6 3 .8  percent 
of total exports of goods and services, dow n from 2 7 2 .2  percent in 1 9 9 2 . In these term s, 
the total debt service-to-exports ratio declined slightly from 2 9 .8  percent in 1 9 9 2  to  2 9 .5  
percent in 1 9 9 3 .
4 ) Aggregate net resource flow s to  all developing countries, understood as net 
flow s on long term  debt, grants excluding technical assistance, and net flow s on equity  
investm ent, including foreign direct investm ent (FDD and portfolio equity investm ent, are 
projected to  increase by 13  percent in 1 9 9 3 , to  $ 1 7 7  billion from  $ 1 5 8  billion in 1 9 9 2 .
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5) Aggregate net resource transfers, understood as net resource flow s, less interest 
on debt and profits on equity investm ent, are projected to  rise to  $ 9 2  billion in 1 9 9 3 , from  
$ 8 0  billion in 1 9 9 2 .
6) The strongest grow th in capital flow s in 1 9 9 3  will take place in East Asia and the  
Pacific, w ith  a large proportion going to  China. A lso, Latin Am erica and the Caribbean will 
show a sizable increase in capital flow s in 1 9 9 3 , expected to  result in positive aggregate  
net transfers for the third consecutive year, amounting to  alm ost 1 percent of GNP in 
1 9 9 3 .
H ow ever, the best new s is found in w h at is characterized as "the remarkable 
turnaround in private capital flow s" m ostly to middle-income developing countries. These  
flow s "have risen more than tw o  and a half tim es since 1 9 9 0 ."  A lso, "for the first tim e in 
a decade, the volume of private flow s has been larger than the volume of official flow s, 
and, in real term s, private flow s are now  about the same as they w ere in the early 1 9 8 0 s ."
This "striking grow th in private flow s" exhibits several key characteristics:
-in flow s from  private sources, there is a shift from  bank to  non-bank sources, such 
as bonds, FDI and equity portfolio investm ent;
-FDI accounts for nearly one-third of the net flow s to  developing countries and it 
has been concentrated in services;
-also, there is a shift from predominantly sovereign m ainly to  private borrowers, 
w ith  private-to-private flow s now  accounting for alm ost 6 0  percent of to tal flow s to  
developing countries;
-the predominance as recipients of middle-income countries, w ith  the notable 
exception of low-incom e China.
By contrast, there is a virtual stagnation in net resource flow s to the low-incom e  
countries, th a t still rely heavily on official (mainly concessional) financing, w hich has 
remained stable in real term s over the past three years. W ithin this low -incom e group, 
there are about tw o  dozen severely indebted countries (SILICs), m ostly in Sub-Saharan  
Africa and including Honduras and Nicaragua, w hose debt stock has tripled over the past 
decade. These countries have seen negative net flow s from private sources, w hich have 
been offset by large official inflow s, m ostly on concessional term s.
In these conditions, a dichotom y has emerged among the developing countries. A  
small group of middle-income countries is attracting most of the rising private capital 
flow s, w hile  several low -incom e countries have not yet benefited from this recent surge in 
private investm ent.
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IV .2 . INFRASTRUCTURE A N D  DEVELOPMENT  
(W D W /1 8 /9 4  2 2  June 1 9 9 4 )
This is the topic of this year's W orld Developm ent Report (W D R ), released by the  
W orld Bank on June 19. President Lewis Preston recalled th a t, as w ith  the previous tw o  
Reports dedicated to  health and to  the environm ent, "infrastructure is an area in w hich  
governm ent policy and finance have an im portant role to  play because of its pervasive 
im pact on econom ic developm ent and human w elfare ." Thus, having focused on some key 
global aspects of developm ent, such as poverty and developm ent strategies, the W orld  
Bank continues setting the developm ent agenda by focusing on certain key sectors. 
Evidently, these yearly agenda-setting exercises represented by the W D R , are relevant not 
only because of the saliency of the topics discussed, but also and perhaps even more so 
due to  the influence they exercise on lending activities.
The term  infrastructure comprises the following three categories: public utilities, 
public works and other transport sectors. A  diagnosis of "the perform ance of 
infrastructure" concludes th a t it depends not from "general conditions of econom ic growth  
and developm ent," but from  "the institutional arrangem ents for providing infrastructure  
services and the incentives governing their delivery."
An evaluation of perform ance, based on the "institutional environm ent" th a t prevails 
in the delivery of these services, leads to  the three main conclusions around w hich the  
Report is organized. Poor infrastructure performance is accounted by: 1) "absence of 
com petition"; 2) lack of "managerial and financial autonom y"; and 3) scarce participation  
by users. "Individually," the Report concludes, "each of these three points is im portant. 
Together, they go a long w a y  tow ard  explaining the disappointing perform ance of much 
infrastructure."
In these term s, the challenge is characterized as "creating the institutional and 
organizational conditions th a t oblige suppliers of infrastructure services to  be more efficient 
and more responsive to  the needs of users."
Three "converging forces" are contributing to  the possibility of responding to this 
challenge. First, "new  technology and changes in the regulatory m anagem ent of m arkets," 
for instance, in telecom m unications and power generation. Second, "new  perceptions of 
the role of governm ent," particularly, "awareness . . . th a t governm ent provision has been 
inadequate" has led to  privatization, w ith  the "m ost dram atic" exam ples found in the  
M exican telephone system  and the Chilean power system . Finally, "increasing regard for 
environmental sustainability of developm ent strategies and deepening concern for poverty 
reduction after a decade of stagnation in many regions of the world also give im petus to  
infrastructure reform ."
The proposed reforms aim at "the w ider application of com m ercial principles to  
service providers, the broader use of com petition, and the increased involvem ent of users." 
These basic goals "apply w hether infrastructure services are provided by the public sector, 
the private sector or a public private partnership." Thus, the main proposal consists of "a 
menu of main options for ownership and provision" comprising first, "public ownership and 
public operation"; second, "public ownership w ith  private operation"; third, "private 
ownership and private operation"; and fourth, "com m unity and user provision."
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A ny of these options requires financing for their im plem entation. Presently, 
"developing countries invest $ 2 0 0  billion a year in new  infrastructure -  4  percent of their 
national output and a fifth  of their total investm ent." Private financing "accounts for about 
7 percent of to ta l infrastructure financing in developing countries," w hile "bilateral and 
m ultilateral foreign aid accounts for around another 12  percent." Even if the increased 
share of the dom estic savings needed to  finance infrastructure provision could com e from  
private sources, "governm ents will continue to  be a major source of funds for 
infrastructure, as w ell as a conduit for resources from the donor com m unity."
To conclude, "reform will produce three types of gains: reduction in subsidies, 
technical gains to  suppliers, and gains to  users." From "the reduction in the fiscal burden-- 
costs not recovered from  users," based on "a conservative estim ate for three sectors 
(pow er, w a te r and railw ay), the total savings are nearly $ 1 2 3  billion annually." This  
am ount represents approxim ately "1 0  percent of total governm ent revenues in developing 
countries, 6 0  percent of annual infrastructure investm ent, and approxim ately five tim es  
annual developm ent finance for infrastructure." The "savings to  service providers... are 
estim ated a t around $ 5 5  billion a year." These are "equivalent to  1 percent of all 
developing countries' GDP, a quarter of annual infrastructure investm ent, and tw ic e  annual 
developm ent finance for infrastructure."
Finally, the Report m entions, in the "bibliographical note," approxim ately one 
hundred "contributors and consultation meeting attendees" from outside the Bank. 
H ow ever, despite the frequent reference to  Latin Am erican successful and failed exam ples  
of infrastructure services, only one governm ent official from M exico, one s ta ff m em ber of 
the Inter-Am erican Developm ent Bank, and one academ ic from  the Universidad de Chile are 
listed among the very impressive group of individuals consulted.
IV .3 . S U B STA N TIA L INCREASE
(W D W /2 9 /9 4  12  October 1 9 9 4 )
The last W orld Economic Outlook (W EO), released by the s ta ff of the IMF  
(W D W /2 8 /9 4 ) , contains a chapter dedicated to the "substantial rise" in private capital 
flow s to  several developing countries. It includes a description of present trends, 
explanatory factors, an analysis of policy responses and of alternative m edium -term  
scenarios.
The "recent surge" in capital flow s to  developing countries is d ifferent, quantitatively and 
qualitatively, to  the experience of the m id -1980s  and that of the 1 9 7 0 s . Q uantitatively, 
annual averages "m ask considerable variations." For instance, "the net inflow  in 1981 was  
just under $ 5 2  billion, in 1 9 8 9  it w as  minus $ 1 4  billion, whereas in 1 9 9 3  it exceeded  
$ 1 3 0  billion." Q ualitatively, a positive trend in recent flow s is a steady increase in foreign 
direct investm ent. A lso, short term  inflow s and long-term portfolio investm ents in 
emerging stock m arkets have "increased sharply."
The developing countries of Asia "have been by far the main recipients of capital 
inflow s in the form of portfolio and foreign direct investm ent." Some developing countries 
of the W estern  Hem isphere, such as M exico, Argentina, and Chile, "have also benefited
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considerably from foreign direct investm ent, which has am ounted to over $ 1 2  billion 
annually in the recent period." Also impressive, portfolio investm ent flow s to  the  
developing countries of the W estern  Hemisphere "have averaged $ 2 5  billion a year, 
partially offset by an average outflow  of over $7  billion a year over the period 1 9 9 0 -9 3 ."  
The exception are the African countries, because "net flow s to  A frica of short-term  and 
other long-term capital . . . have been negative in recent years, primarily reflecting flow s  
out of Nigeria and South A frica."
Both external and dom estic factors explain the recent increase in capital flow s to  
developing countries. Externally, cyclical factors have played im portant roles, such as "the 
dow nturn in econom ic activ ity  and the decline in interest rates in the large industrial 
countries during recent recessions." Empirical studies have estim ated th a t "external 
factors m ay have accounted for some 3 0  to  5 0  percent of the variation in capital flow s to  
developing countries." In some Latin Am erican countries, such as Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
and Peru, "external factors typically explained about 5 0  percent, w hile in Asia, particularly 
in China, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, external factors typically contributed about 
3 0  percent."
Other external factors have to  do w ith  long-term trends, such as the "globalization  
and international diversification of industrial country investm ents," reinforced by "the 
extent of financial deregulation in industrial and developing countries, w hich has resulted in 
greater com petition in financial m arkets and has increased international capital m obility."
Dom estic factors also played a key role, particularly in those countries of Latin 
Am erica and Asia th a t "m ade substantial progress in fostering m acroeconom ic stability."
In countries such as Argentina, Chile, M exico, and Thailand, "significant reductions in 
fiscal deficits preceded the surge in capital inflow s." H ow ever, other countries such as 
Brazil, India, and Turkey, "that have made much less progress tow ard fiscal sustainability .
. . have also attracted  relatively large inflow s." Here, "large fiscal deficits have exerted  
upward pressure on dom estic interest rates" and short-term  capital inflow s "have been 
attracted by the resulting interest rate differentials." The non-debt- creating nature of 
recent capital flow s has generated concerns among policymakers about "the im pact on 
dom estic m onetary conditions, the possibility of an intensification of inflationary pressures, 
and an excessive appreciation of the real exchange rate." The perform ance of Asia and 
Latin Am erica reveals that in Asia, the ratio of private investm ent to  GDP, which w as  
already relatively high during the 19 8 0 s  at over 3 0  percent, has risen by a further 2 
percentage points in the recent period compared w ith  the m id -1 9 8 0 s ."  In Latin Am erica, 
"investm ent-to-GDP ratios have remained broadly constant, indicating th a t higher capital 
inflow s have been associated w ith  declining dom estic saving and can therefore be said to  
have largely financed higher consumption."
Due to  "the lack of flexibility of fiscal policy to  deal w ith  short-term  fluctuations, 
much of the task of managing capital inflow s has therefore fallen on m onetary policy." A  
quick response has been "sterilized intervention to  contain the m onetary e ffec t of the  
increase in foreign exchange reserves." H ow ever, intervention m ay be costly "to the  
extent that dom estic interest rates are higher than the return on foreign reserves." For 
instance "in Chile and Colombia, these costs w ere estim ated to  be around 0 .8  percent of 
GDP in 1 9 9 1 ."
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Looking ahead, " tw o  alternative scenarios" are based on "different assumptions  
about capital inflow s and policy reform s as well as the external environm ent." A  scenario  
of "downside risks," projects th a t "output grow th in the developing countries would be 
reduced by alm ost 3 percent by the third year of the simulations." Another scenario  
"assumes a continued deepening and broadening of policy reforms in the developing 
countries and im provem ents in the external environm ent." The results are th a t "grow th in 
the developing countries would rise by about 112 of 1 percent a year over the next three  
years."
IV .4 . F INANCING  PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE  
(W D W /3 1 /9 4  2 6  O ctober 1 9 9 4 )
The new  trends in financing infrastructure are a consequence of the profound 
transform ation th a t is taking place in infrastructure m anagem ent in developing countries.
By contrast w ith  the recent past, the privatization of infrastructure has now  become a 
dom inant trend in both developed and developing countries. According to  the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector lender of the W orld Bank Group, infrastructure  
privatizations in the developing countries, betw een 1 9 8 8  and 1 9 9 2 , am ounted to  $ 6 1 .6  
billion.
A recent survey carried out by the IFC found several factors behind this trend. First, 
there is growing dissatisfaction w ith  the performance of publicly owned infrastructure  
services, such as urban pow er and w ater shortages; lengthy w aiting tim es for telephone  
connections; and road congestion and deterioration. Second, this poor perform ance has 
been mainly caused by underinvestm ent, resulting from fiscal constraints present among 
governm ents and external suppliers of official developm ent finance.
Third, technological breakthroughs have punctured the "natural monopoly" positions 
of traditional utilities and infrastructure services. This phenomenon, known as 
"unbundling," allows for the effic ient fracturing of the production, the m arket or the  
geographic perform ance of a service. For instance, different companies can participate in 
the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity; telephone services can be split 
into cellular, international, long distance and local; and gas and electricity distribution can 
be broken dow n geographically by regions.
Fourth, globalization of financial m arkets and innovations in financial instruments  
have led to  increases in volum es and to the diversification of instrum ents. For instance, 
bonds issued by large, publicly listed firm s, purchased by long term  institutional investors, 
such as pension funds; or revenue bonds based on cash flow s and assets to  repay debt 
and for security. Finally, a "dem onstration e ffec t"  has allowed for learning from the  
experiences of others, particularly from the trend-setting precedents initiated in developed  
countries. For instance, the United S tates Public Utilities Regulatory Policy A ct of 1 9 7 8 ,  
allowed independent producers to  supply power to  existing utilities. The split of A T & T , in 
1 9 8 4 , showed how  "unbundling" increased com petition in telecom m unications and it w as  
im m ediately follow ed in England and Japan. Among the developing countries, in Latin 
A m erica, Chile and Argentina w ere  the trend-setters.
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This global privatization trend, is described in a recent IFC discussion paper (number 
2 3 ), titled "Financing Private Infrastructure Projects," by Gary Bond and Laurence Carter. 
This paper analyzes the experience gained by the IFC in financing "economic 
infrastructure," including power generation, transmission and distribution; ports; 
telecom m unications; railways; roads; w ater supply and distribution; w aste  m anagem ent 
and disposal; mass transit; and airports.
IFC 's infrastructure financing has recently "w idened rapidly," alm ost "9 0 %  of 
approvals" date from  1 9 9 0 , "w ith  a sharp acceleration evident" since 1 9 9 2 . O ut of "88  
infrastructure operations w ith  a total project cost of nearly $ 1 5  billion," undertaken by the  
IFC from  1 9 6 6  until June 1 9 9 4  in 2 6  countries, Latin Am erica dom inates w ith  4 5 ,  
particularly Argentina (1 5 ), Chile (1 0 ), and M exico (5 ). Asia fo llow s, w ith  India and the  
Philippines leading w ith  11 projects each. Finance for IFC approved infrastructure projects 
has com e from different sources: 35  percent from private foreign finance accounts, 
including suppliers' credits; 2 5  percent from private dom estic financiers; 2 0  percent of 
internal cash generation; 9  percent from official/public; and 11 percent contributed by the  
IFC.
Out of a total of 78  projects approved by IFC, betw een 1 9 6 6  and June 1 9 9 4 , w ith  
a total cost of $ 1 4 .6  billion, IFC contributed " $ 1 .5 8  billion from its ow n funds, and 
mobilized a further $ 1 .1 2  billion directly via participations and syndications."
The study draw s several conclusions from IFC's "relatively recent experience": 1) 
"large am ounts of private non/lim ited recourse finance can be mobilized for infrastructure 
projects." 2) "private financing and m anagem ent of infrastructure can deliver better service 
perform ance than under public sector m anagem ent." 3) "private financiers and managers 
can provide rapid responses and innovative solutions to  infrastructure requirem ents." 4) 
"the m ost d ifficult hurdle is the initial project: once the process starts, it can quickly gather 
m om entum ." 5) "infrastructure financing, access to  international capital m arkets and the  
developm ent of dom estic capital m arkets are occurring in parallel in several countries." 6) 
"accessing capital m arkets is crucial for infrastructure financing." 7) "private companies  
(and their financiers) treat environmental risks in infrastructure projects like other risks-- 
they assess, m itigate and allocate them ."
Finally, "the main conclusion is that despite the risks, private financiers are 
responding to  emerging opportunities and are providing large am ounts of at-risk capital to 
invest in infrastructure services in developing countries."
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V. DERIVATIVES
V .1 . DEFINITION
(W D W /3 /9 4  2 February 1 9 9 4 )
As junk bonds becam e the symbol of the eighties in financial m arkets, there is 
increasing evidence th a t derivatives m ay become the symbol of the nineties.
In recent years, financial derivative m arkets have experienced "phenomenal 
grow th ." According to  a recent study by Eli M . Remolona, published in the W in ter 9 2 -9 3  
issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of N ew  York's Quarterly R eview , "the stock of financial 
derivatives outstanding w orldw ide . . . multiplied fivefold in five years to approach $ 1 0  
trillion by the end of 1 9 9 1 ."  For instance, "in organized exchanges, open interest in 
financial derivatives rose an average of 3 6  percent a year from 1 9 8 6  to  reach $ 3 .5  trillion 
at the end of 1 9 9 1 ."  This spectacular expansion w as  "surpassed by the grow th of 
financial derivatives in over the counter (OTC) m arkets . . .  an estim ated 4 0  percent a year 
during the period to  soar above $6  trillion by the end of 1 9 9 1 ."
W h at are derivatives? A  study released by a study group of the W ashington-based, 
prestigious Group of Thirty  (G -30 ) defines a derivatives transaction as "a contract whose  
value depends on (or 'derives' from ) the value of an underlying asset, reference rate or 
index." Remolona explains th a t these instruments "derive their prices from  the  
perform ance of underlying cash m arkets, specifically m oney and bond m arkets, the foreign 
exchange m arket, and stock m arkets." For the G -30  study group, "while the concept 
underpinning derivatives is sim ple, it is also flexible and powerful: a party exposed to  an 
unw anted risk can pass th a t risk to  another party and assume a different risk, or pay cash, 
in return."
Also, according to  the G -3 0 , "every derivative transaction can be built up from tw o  
simple and fundam ental types of building blocks: forwards and options." Thus, the main 
types of derivatives contracts can be classified under tw o  headings: forward-based and 
option-based.
These transactions can take  place in organized exchanges, such as the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT), or the London International Financial Futures and Options 
Exchange (LIFFE). According to  Remolona, the main feature of the transactions th a t take  
place in organized exchanges is "the interposition of a clearinghouse as a counterparty to  
reduce the credit risk in each transaction." Remolona also points out that "the primary 
econom ic function of exchange-traded derivatives appears to  be the provision of liquidity in 
excess of the liquidity in the cash m arkets."
Additionally, these transactions can take place in over the counter (OTC) m arkets, 
"w ithout the interposition of a clearinghouse." By contrast to  those th a t take place in 
organized exchanges, concludes Remolona, "OTC derivatives are designed primarily to  
reconfigure m arket risk rather than to  provide liquidity."
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The main contracts th a t have experienced the most spectacular expansion in recent 
years are those based on interest rates, as well as those based on the global foreign  
exchange m arket and on the major stock m arkets, known as equity index contracts.
W ho are the end-users of derivatives? Several main users w ere  identified by a 
Survey of Industry Practice, carried out for the G -30  study group and conducted among a 
representative group of 8 0  dealers and 7 2  end-users. Am ong these, corporations, 
governm ents, institutional investors and financial institutions use derivatives to  low er 
funding costs through arbitrage, to diversify funding sources through funding operations in 
multiple countries at low est cost, and to hedge the cost of issuing fixed-rate and floating- 
rate debt.
Since 1 9 8 5 , Remolona found th a t, outside the United S tates, "at least eighteen new  
derivative exchanges have been organized around the w orld , including already established  
stock exchanges th a t only recently began trading derivatives."
Am ong the recently created, one of the most active is the M arche a Term e  
International de France (M A TIF ), established in 1 9 8 6 ; the Tokyo International Financial 
Futures Exchange (TIFFE) created in 1 9 8 9 ; the Deutsche Terminborse (1 9 9 0 ) and the  
Sw iss Options and Financial Futures Exchange (SOFFEX) (1 9 8 6 ). In the same years, the  
only derivatives exchange established in Latin Am erica w as the Bolsa de M ercadorias & 
Futuros (BM &F) of Brazil, established in 1 9 8 6 .
The main factors, identified by Remolona, to explain the grow th and geographical 
diffusion of financial derivatives are: "First, sustained shifts and tem porary surges in 
m arket volatility . . . Second, the em ergence of im portant cash m arkets for governm ent 
bonds . . . Third, interest rate risks faced by financial institutions and nonfinancial 
corporations . . . Finally, the global diversification of institutional equity portfolios."
According to  the G -30  study, "the developm ent of derivatives has occurred in 
response to  a search for higher yields and lower funding costs and a demand for tools to  
m anage risk. The broad demand for derivatives arises from the diverse and changing 
financial needs of a w ide array of users, some hedging current or future risks, some taking  
m arket risk positions, and some exploiting inefficiencies betw een m arkets."
V .2 . PROLIFERATION
(W D W /4 /9 4  9 February 1 9 9 4 )
The "phenomenal grow th" experienced by financial derivative m arkets, in the last 
five years (W D W /3 /9 4 ), poses challenges particularly to  central banks. According to  Alan  
Greenspan, Chairman of the U. S. Federal Reserve System , in rem arks m ade to  the  
London's Bankers Club on 1 February 1 9 9 4 , "derivative instrum ents . . . have generated an 
elaborate w eb  of financial interrelationships th a t recognize no national borders. These  
instruments heighten the interdependencies of m arkets and m arket participants. 
Disturbances in one country or sector are rapidly transm itted throughout the world
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econom y. They pose challenges to  central banks now  clearly recognized responsibility for 
the stability of the w orld 's interdependent financial system ."
In other w ords, w hile the grow th in derivatives has generated im portant benefits, it 
is also generating new  risks th a t som etim es are not yet adequately understood.
Eli M . Remolona, in the W in ter 9 2 -9 3  issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of N ew  
York's Quarterly R ev iew , has described the three different types of contracts th a t are most 
w idely  used in financial derivative transactions.
First, "grow th in derivatives has been dominated by contracts based on interest 
rates," such as contracts on short-term  interest rates th a t "have as their underlying cash 
m arkets the various m oney m arkets around the globe." Also, there are contracts on long­
term  interest rates th a t have as underlying m arkets "the w orld 's major bond m arkets, most 
notably the U .S . Treasury bond m arket."
Another major contributor to the grow th in derivatives after interest rate contracts, 
"in a com paratively small w a y ,"  are currency contracts. "The underlying cash m arket for 
these contracts is the global foreign exchange m arket." Just to  have an idea of the  
magnitude of this m arket, according to  Chairman Greenspan, "a 1 9 9 2  survey conducted by 
the major central banks found th a t normal turnover in foreign exchange m arkets alone 
approxim ated $1 trillion a day." Additionally, it has been estim ated th a t only less than 5 
percent of these transactions are related to trade or tourism.
Finally, the sm allest part of the derivatives m arket is represented by equity index 
contracts. H ow ever, Remolona observes th a t "their recent grow th has been so explosive 
th a t th ey  promise to  become a major part of the m arket in the near fu ture." The underlying 
m arkets for equity index contracts are "the major stock m arkets around the w orld, most 
notably the N ew  York, Tokyo and Frankfurt stock m arkets."
Remolona also found th a t there is a "life cycle composed of d ifferent stages," that 
characterizes the acceptance and spread of these new  financial products. Based on the  
trading experience of U .S . Treasury bond futures, "the w orld 's most actively traded  
contract," the cycle exhibits an "S shaped pattern," th a t "begins slow ly, then surges as 
the contract becomes popular, and finally slows down as the contract m atures and 
saturates the m arket."
There are several factors influencing this cycle. On the supply side, Remolona finds 
"advances in com m unication and information-processing technologies and the developm ent 
of option pricing and simulation models." H ow ever, "the derivatives' spread w as  rooted in 
specific demand forces th a t largely determ ined the direction and speed th a t the spread 
took."
These "powerful forces of demand played a decisive role in shaping the spread of 
derivatives in recent years." Remolona identifies four broad developm ents th a t have 
contributed recently to the demand for financial innovations. First, "the volatility created  
by shifts in policy regim es," such as the system  of floating exchange rates that started in 
1 9 7 3  and brought volatility to  the foreign exchange m arket." A lso, the U .S . Federal 
Reserve shift in October 1 9 7 9  to  targeting m onetary aggregates, rather than interest rates, 
"lifted interest rate volatility to  unprecedented levels."
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Second, the increased demand for liquidity in new  governm ent bond m arkets, 
according to  Remolona, explains "the strong grow th of exchange-traded futures on long­
term  interest rates." This has been the case particularly in the French and German  
governm ent bond m arkets.
Third, "demands by both financial and nonfinancial firms for new  w ays of dealing 
w ith  interest rate m ovem ents help explain the huge expansion in interest rate sw aps." For 
instance, these sw aps consist of the "exchange of tw o  notes paying tw o  d ifferent types of 
interest stream s--m ost com m only a floating-rate note and a fixed-rate no te--w ithout an 
exchange of principal am ounts." The purpose of such sw aps is "to allow  a transfer of 
interest rate risk th a t entailed no credit risks associated w ith  the principal."
Finally, the global diversification of equity portfolios "contributed to  the grow th of 
OTC (over-the-counter) equity index option m arket." The purpose of diversification is to  
"reduce risk w ithout sacrificing return" and it w as  fueled by the issuance of equity linked 
Eurobonds by Japanese corporations. The "demand for these options surged w hen  
volatility began to  beset the Tokyo stock m arket in 1 9 9 0 ."  Based on the experience  
gained w ith  the Japanese contracts, investors have turned tow ard  "other major stock 
m arkets, notably the N ew  York and Frankfurt m arkets.
V .3 . REGULATION
(W D W /5 /9 4  16  February 1 9 9 4 )
As pointed by the Chairman of the U .S . Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, the 
proliferation of financial derivatives "poses challenges" to  the central banks' role of 
"ensuring the stability and integrity of national financial system s and, to  the extent 
possible, the international financial system ." (W D W /4 /9 4 ).
This concern is not based solely on the increase in risks. Because, as Chairman  
Greenspan recalled, "the taking of risks is an integral part of banking and our m arket 
econom ies." A t stake is th a t "problems th a t arise are contained and do not evolve into 
system ic crises."
These "system ic risks" w ere the central focus of a presentation m ade, on 
Septem ber 2 7 , 1 9 9 3 , by the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of N ew  York, W illiam  
J. M cDonough, to the Group of Thirty (G -30) com m enting on the Group's recent report on 
Derivatives Practices and Principles (W D W /3 /9 4 ).
According to  President M cDonough, the "first line of defense against disruptions to  
the derivatives m arkets is the risk m anagem ent capabilities of all firms active in these  
m arkets." For this reason, he w elcom es the tw e n ty  detailed recom m endations for the  
m anagem ent of derivatives, spelled out in the G -30  study, such as the active involvem ent 
in risk m anagem ent by top managers; "a comprehensive approach to  risk m anagem ent and 
control;" valuation procedures that avoid "underpricing of sizable risks;" m anagem ent 
information system s that "measure and monitor risks in the real tim e fram e of the trading 
desks;" national steering com m ittees and international mechanisms to promote harmonized 
accounting practices and standards to  enhance firms and system  exposures.
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How ever, a divergence exists betw een operators and regulators in the perception of 
the system ic risks generated by the proliferation of derivatives.. According to  Paul Volcker, 
w ho signs the forew ord of the G -3 0  study now  as Chairman of the Group, "derivatives by 
their nature do not introduce risks of a fundam entally different kind or of a greater scale 
than those already present in the financial m arkets. Hence, system ic risks are not 
appreciably aggravated, and supervisory concerns can be addressed w ith in  present 
regulatory structures and approaches."
By contrast. President M cDonough declares th a t "the section of the G -3 0  report 
about w hich I have the m ost significant reservations is that on system ic risks. W hile the  
report identifies m any of the potential sources of system ic problems, the discussion, 
perhaps inadvertently, appears to  understate these concerns." In fa c t, M ichelle Celarier 
reported in Global Finance (October 1 9 9 3 ) th a t "m any observers v iew  the industry-w ritten  
Group of 3 0  report on derivatives. . .as an attem pt to  slow dow n the regulatory process."
For President M cDonough there are tw o  broad categories of system ic risks 
associated w ith  derivatives. First, "disruptions which have their origin in derivatives  
activities at the individual firm  level." Some of these risks are covered by the G -3 0  report, 
such as "underpricing of credit, m arket liquidity," and the difficulties of "senior 
m anagem ent in detecting fraud in the internal reporting of com plex derivatives positions."
The second category of risks "is less well understood" and it has to  do w ith  "the 
w ays in w hich the spread of derivative instrum ents, coupled w ith  advances in technology  
and telecom m unications, have altered the susceptibility of the financial system  to  shocks." 
For President M cDonough, "the decreased transparency of firm s' exposures can contribute  
to  the developm ent of a financial crisis." For instance, "if a major m arket m aker in 
derivatives instrum ents w ere  to  fail, it could prove difficult to  find other firms willing to  
take over or unwind a com plex derivatives book whose risks are difficult to  assess 
quickly." Chairman Greenspan adm its th a t the "potential for system ic risk arises from  the 
nature of internationally active banks." As reported by Celarier, the com plication is that 
"global derivatives business is a highly concentrated one, w ith  a mere 5 0  banks reporting 
any activ ity  at all."
Another exam ple is known as "positive feedback," understood as "mechanism s that 
have the potential to exacerbate an already sharp price m ove." Therefore, "w ritten  
options, as a m atter of course, tend to be dynam ically hedged and hence require selling 
into a falling m arket." Again, President M cDonough notes that the G -30  study holds that 
"academ ic research has shown th a t derivatives trading does not increase volatility in 
underlying m arkets." The problem is that "econom etric studies do not shed much light on 
the experience w ith  volatility in tim es of stress, because these episodes occur infrequently  
and tend to d iffer greatly in character, making them  difficult to summarize em pirically."
Finally, beyond these risks. President McDonough m entions tw o  questions raised by 
the w a y  the "expanded use of derivatives" is affecting the "channels of influence of 
m onetary policy." First, have derivatives altered bank's liquidity and interest rate 
m anagem ent practices, and m ight these alterations a ffec t the channels of transmission of 
m onetary policy? Second, has the improved ability of corporations to  hedge interest rate 
and exchange rate risks altered the sensitivity of their investm ent decisions to interest rate 
and exchange rate m ovements?
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V .4 . TURBULENCE
(W D W /1 1 /9 4  3 0  M arch 1 9 9 4 )
Recent events at both the policy and the micro levels have confirmed some 
concerns th a t regulators have been voicing about the volatility and risks inherent in 
derivatives m arkets.
A t the policy level, the  decision by the Federal Reserve (FED), of Friday, February 4 , 
to  increase interest rates by a fraction and the consequent sales in stock m arkets, had 
im m ediate repercussions. As described in The W all S treet Journal, the FED tightening led 
to "an electrifying day for U .S . derivatives m arkets."
On th a t day, prices for derivatives transacted in organized exchanges "gyrated  
w ildly in contracts based on stocks, interest rates, foreign currencies and precious m etals." 
The leader w as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CM E), "trading more than 2 .3  million 
futures and options contracts -- about a million more contracts than any derivatives  
exchange has ever traded in a single day." In the term s of a stunned trader, "I just know  
that this m arket goes dow n a heck of a lot faster than it goes up."
A t the micro level, in January, MG the U .S . subsidiary of a German giant 
corporation, experienced losses amounting to  $ 1 .9 6  billion, trading in oil futures a t the  
N ew  York M ercantile Exchange. An em ergency package amounting to  $2  billion, to  rescue 
the conglom erate M etallgesellschaft A G , which employs 5 8 ,0 0 0  persons, w as put together 
by its major shareholders, led by the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank.
The operation started last spring w ith  M G 's  offer of fixed price contracts of up to  
10 years of refined oil products. These long-term com m itm ents w ere hedged against a rise 
in oil prices by means of short term  energy futures and over the counter derivatives. The  
hope w as  th a t if the prices of oil rose above those com m itted in the long-term contracts, 
the losses would be o ffset by the price increases in the prices of the short-term  futures. 
How ever, instead of rising, in the short-term , oil prices dived to  a five-year low .
By contrast, profits can also be as impressive. Merrill Lynch, the U .S . biggest 
brokerage firm , recently disclosed that its 1 9 9 3  revenue from trading sw aps and 
derivatives am ounted to $761 million in 1 9 9 3 , a 5 7  per cent increase from 1 9 9 2 . This is 
the first tim e th a t the revenue from derivatives exceeds revenues from stocks and also the  
first tim e that the com pany has disclosed such information to  its shareholders.
These disclosures are in part a response to the increasing concerns voiced by some 
regulators (W D W /5 /9 4 ) about the risks generated by the "phenomenal grow th"
(W D W /3 /9 4 ) th a t is taking place in derivatives m arkets.
An intense debate is taking place among regulators about the degree and kind of 
supervision th a t should be exercised over these activities. Som e lines of this debate w ere  
openly discussed at a conference on financial m arkets, sponsored by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of A tlan ta , in Coconut Grove, Florida, last February 2 4 -2 6 .
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Susan M . Phillips, m em ber of the Board of Governors of the FED, m ade a keynote  
presentation on Derivatives and Risk M anagem ent: Challenges and Opportunities. One of 
the m ost quoted paragraphs presented by Ms. Phillips referred to  "the concerns th a t have 
been expressed about derivatives by legislators, regulators, and even senior executives of 
financial institutions."
M s. Phillips thinks these concerns "can best be understood as sym ptom s of broader 
anxieties about changes in financial m arkets and, in particular, the roles th a t banks are 
playing in those m arkets." She also supported the proposal to  allow  banks "to use their 
ow n internal models to  determ ine capital requirements for interest rate risk." H ow ever, 
she recognized th a t "regulators w ill be reluctant to  im plem ent such an approach unless 
reliable m ethods can be developed for exam iners to  validate banks' internal m odels." M s. 
Phillips closed her presentation adm itting th a t while more w ork still had to  be done, "the 
persistence of w h a t appear to  be exaggerated fears of the risks of derivatives activities  
m akes it essential th a t this w ork  be com pleted expeditiously."
Also invited to  m ake a presentation w as W illiam  M cDonough, head of the influential 
Federal Reserve Bank of N ew  York, w ho has been voicing some of these concerns about 
the "system ic risks" generated by the proliferation of derivatives. President M cDonough  
presented the more cautious position and warned th a t banks would have to  face more 
intense scrutiny "if they don 't take  seriously the system ic risks th a t com e w ith  the fast- 
growing derivatives m arket." H ow ever, M r. M cDonough adm itted th a t some of these 
warnings "have a nagging quality because w e  have not specified a concrete approach to  
controlling and managing the risk."
Even so. President M cDonough reacted angrily w hen University of Rochester 
Professor Clifford W . Sm ith said "it's  hard to  get people to  get precise about w h a t they  
m ean by system ic risk." The response by Mr. McDonough w as that "it is the role of the  
central bank to  w orry about a possible catastrophe."
As described in the W all S treet Journal, an intense debate is taking place w ith in  the  
FED. Some Board mem bers have a more supportive attitude tow ard  derivatives, while the 
N ew  York FED appears more concerned w ith  the risks.
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VI. TRADE
V I .1. U .S . TRADE POLICY REVIEWED  
(W D W /7 /9 4  2 M arch 1 9 9 4 )
W ithin the fram ew ork of its Trade Policy Review  Mechanism  (TPRM ), the Secretariat 
of the General Agreem ent on Tariffs  and Trade (G A TT) released, on 19 January 1 9 9 4 , the  
biannual review  of the trade policy of the United S tates. The review  consists first, of the  
report subm itted by the U .S . governm ent and second, the report by the G A TT  Secretariat. 
Together, these tw o  reports constitute the most thorough review  of the trade policies 
applied by w h a t still is, according to the G A TT Secretariat, "the w orld 's largest trading  
nation, w ith  imports and exports at 14  and 12 percent of world trade."
The governm ent report contains the following chapters: 1) objectives of U .S . trade 
policy; 2) overview  of the import and export system; 3) trade policy fram ew ork; 4) 
im plem entation of trade and investm ent policies; 5) sectoral aspects of trade policy and 6) 
the external environm ent. The G A TT Secretariat report describes the following topics: 1 ) 
sum m ary observations; 2) the economic environment; 3) trade policy regime: objectives 
and fram ew ork; 4) trade related aspects of the foreign exchange and investm ent regimes;
5) trade policies and practices by measure; 6) trade policies by sector; 7) trade disputes 
and consultations.
According to  the G A TT Secretariat, "U .S . trade law s remained largely unchanged  
during the tw o  years to  October 1 9 9 3 ."  Also, "since the last review  of its trade policies in 
the G A TT Council, the United S tates has continued to  affirm  its adherence to  the principle 
of free trade." Evidence of this is found in the "major role" played by the United S tates in 
"bringing the Uruguay Round to  a successful conclusion," as well as in its "regional trading 
interests notably through the completion of negotiations on, and subsequent ratification of, 
the North Am erican Free Trade A greem ent."
These w ere among "the highest priorities" of w h at the U .S . governm ent 
characterizes as "a m ulti-track strategy of m ultilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations, 
and the effective  enforcem ent of m ultilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreem ents." The 
other priorities of this strategy, besides the completion of the Uruguay Round and the  
approval of the North Am erican Free Trade A greem ent (N A FTA ), are "the strengthening of 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organization (APEC); and the bilateral negotiation of 
improved access to the Japanese m arket under the so-called U .S .-Japan Fram ework  
A greem ent."
H ow ever, certain exceptions remain to this "adherence to  liberal trading principles, 
w ith  high tariffs  and other measures in place" in agriculture and textiles. A lso, the United 
States "m aintained bilateral pressures for the opening of external m arkets."
The G A TT Secretariat hopes that the "im plem entation of the Uruguay Round will 
begin to  redress this situation," because "given the size of the U. S. econom y, and its 
importance in world trade, any distortions stemming from trade intervention have 
significant adverse effects  on world trade and the international econom y."
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The description of policies and practices by m easure concludes th a t "the United  
States has not significantly modified the level and structure of its tariffs  since the last 
re v ie w .” Furtherm ore, "the average ta riff rate remains low , a t 6 .7  percent," but 
"dispersion persists across the range." For instance, the "highest protection through tariffs  
is found in sugar, preserved tuna, beverages and tobacco, textiles and structural mineral 
products such as glass and ceram ics."
H ow ever, "in 1 9 9 2 , just over 6 0  per cent of U .S . imports cam e from  purely m .f.n . 
sources, i.e. from  trading partners not eligible for any form  of preferential treatm ent. Some 
19 per cent of imports into the United S tates in 1 9 9 2  derived from partners w ith  w hom  the 
United S tates has free trade agreem ents and alm ost 2 0 .5  percent of imports w as  from  
other sources eligible for preferential treatm ent."
Additionally, "im port quotas, licenses or voluntary export restraints restrict U .S. 
imports of dairy products, cotton , peanuts, sugar and sugar-containing products, and beef 
and veal," as w ell as textiles, m achine tools and passenger cars.
The G A TT  Secretariat finds th a t despite "its efforts to  open public procurement 
m arkets abroad," the United S tates still has "a number of trade restrictive m easures at 
hom e." In 1 9 9 1 , U .S . public purchasing "am ounted to  over U S $ 1 ,1 0 0  billion, or 19  
percent of GDP, of w hich federal procurem ent w as in the order of U S $ 4 5 0  billion."
The G A TT  Secretariat registers th a t "the number of anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty orders in force rose from  2 0 4  and 7 0  respectively in June 1991 to 2 6 8  and 8 6  in
1 9 9 3 ."  A lso, there still is "no sunset provision in U .S . anti-dumping legislation." The  
secretariat's  report points out th a t "m any contracting parties have expressed concern  
about unilateralism in U .S . trade policy." To this, "the U .S. authorities stress th a t the  
operation of these law s is subject to multilateral dispute settlem ent procedures."
All in all, the G A TT Secretariat concludes th a t the United S tates is in a "favorable  
position to  face the com petition th a t will result from  the Uruguay Round and the N A FTA , 
but will remain vulnerable to dom estic protectionist pressures."
V I .2. SUPER 301 R EACTIVATED  
(W D W /8 /9 4  9 March 1 9 9 4 )
Like tw o  sumo w restlers positioning them selves for the first clinch, last w eek , the  
United S tates adopted several m easures to  signal its displeasure w ith  the pace and results 
of the ongoing negotiations w ith  Japan. The reactivation of the much dreaded Super 301  
w as the last step in a succession of events that w en t from the suspension of negotiations 
on the eve of the Japanese Prime M inister's visit to  W ashington, on February 11 , to  the 
unprecedented admission by Prime M inister Hosokawa and President Clinton, a t the  
conclusion of their talks, th a t th ey  w ere unable to  agree.
Thus cam e to  a non conclusion the last a ttem pt by the United S tates to  find a 
negotiated solution to  its persistent trade deficit w ith  Japan, w hich has com plicated the  
relations betw een the tw o  m ost powerful players of the international econom y. As
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described by the United S tates Trade Representative M ichael Kantor, "w e  have had an 
annual m inuet w ith  the Japanese for the last tw e n ty  years: w e  would reach agreem ent 
after agreem ent th a t sounded good, but little changed and Japan's trade surpluses kept 
growing." In confirm ation, Japan's surplus rose 17 percent in January, to  $6 .11  billion 
from $ 5 .2 2  billion a year earlier. W ith  the United S tates, Japan's surplus grew  7 percent 
from a year earlier, to  $ 3 .1 3  billion, less than the 17 percent it grew  in Decem ber.
Last sum m er, the Clinton Adm inistration hailed, as reflecting a new  approach, the  
last m inute agreem ent arrived at the Tokyo Sum m it creating a fram ew ork for negotiations, 
containing "objective criteria" th a t would result in "tangible progress." The most recent 
failure of the conversations w as  due to  the Japanese refusal to  accept such "objective  
criteria ,” to  measure m arket openness in autos and auto parts, insurance, and governm ent 
procurem ent of medical and telecom m unications equipm ent.
Japanese negotiators consider these benchmarks are a violation of free m arket 
principles and an attem pt a t managed trade. For Am bassador Kantor, "this dispute can be 
seen as a significant maturing of our relationship. For the first tim e, both sides are openly 
and honestly adm itting the differences betw een us." W e  are no longer willing to  look the  
other w a y  w hen key Am erican interests are at stake. W e will no longer to lerate Japanese 
barriers to  U .S . exports."
Several factors are mentioned to  explain th a t this tim e the U .S . posture is d ifferent. 
First, the author of the "results oriented" trade policy is form er Berkeley Professor of 
econom ics Laura D 'Andrea Tyson, now  head of President Clinton's Council of Economic 
Advisers (CEA). Professor Tyson w rote the textbook on Japanese trade barriers on 
imports of cellular phones, titled W ho 's  Bashing W h o m ?
Second, this tim e the U .S . negotiating team  is made up of business persons, w ho  
have learned to  deal w ith  Japan in the trenches. For instance, Deputy Secretary of the 
Treasury Roger A ltm an advised the Duracell Holdings Corporation on how  to  fight for shelf 
space in Tokyo against M atsushita and Hitachi. Undersecretary of S tate  for Economic 
Affairs Joan Spero w as in charge of securing for Am erican Express the right to issue credit 
cards in Japan. Com m erce Undersecretary Jeffrey Garten fought a long battle to  gain a 
seat on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for Shearson Lehman Brothers. The chairperson of the  
National Economic Council (NEC) Robert E. Rubin w as co-chairperson of Goldman Sachs, 
an investm ent bank partly owned by Sum itom o Bank. M oreover, Mr. Rubin's deputy, W . 
Bowm an Cuttler, as a consultant for Coopers and Lybrand, advised U .S . companies on 
how  to penetrate Japan's telecom m unications m arket. A lso, Deputy USTR Charlene 
Barshefsky, w ho leads the U .S . negotiating team , has represented several U .S . companies  
in litigation against Japanese com petitors. Finally, Am bassador Kantor is displaying a 
"tough cop" negotiating style, described as "w e are going to have a results-oriented  
agreem ent or no agreem ent."
Other pressures are also present because the yen is approaching the 1 0 0  to  a dollar 
m ark, despite the statem ent by the U .S . Treasury th a t "w e do not believe in artificially  
manipulating exchange rates." Nonetheless, as described by the influential C. Fred 
Bergsten, from the W ashington-based Institute for International Economics, the U .S. 
Treasury "will just sit back and let the m arkets push the yen up." In the term s of Robert 
Horm ats, of Goldman Sachs International, "W ashington can afford to  w a it, and let the yen 
do their talking."
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H ow ever, the reactivation of Super 301 does not im m ediately lead to  the adoption  
of sanctions. The first step is to  identify those countries th a t impose barriers on U .S. 
exports, to  be done on M arch 3 1 , w hen the USTR releases the inventory of trade barriers 
confronted by U .S . exports throughout the world.
The Super 301  target list will be announced until Septem ber 3 0 , and such 
identification unleashes a review  period of eighteen months. As Thom as Friedman  
described it in The N ew  York T im es . Super 301  is like "locking and loading a rifle, but 
w ithou t pulling the trigger," w hich m ay partially explain the restrained initial reaction from  
Japan.
Be it as it m ay, in Am bassador Kantor's term s, the bottom  line is th a t recent events  
constitute "a transition into a new  w a y  of doing business w ith  Japan. There is no more 
status quo."
V I .3 . THE U .S . TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR 1 9 9 4  
(W D W /1 2 /9 4  6 April 1 9 9 4 )
To judge by the Clinton Adm inistration's outstanding achievem ents in international 
trade during 1 9 9 3 , w h a t should com e now  is a tim e for consolidation. As described by U.
S. Trade Representative (USTR) M ichael Kantor, in the introduction of this year's A genda, 
"last year, the United S tates enjoyed the m ost successful-and  im portant--year in trade in 
our history."
Be it as it m ay. Section 1641 of the Omnibus Trade and Com petitiveness A c t of 
1 9 8 8 , m andates "the President shall subm it to  the Congress during each year (but not later 
than M arch 1) a report on A) the operation of the trade agreem ents program ... and B) the 
national trade policy agenda for the year in which the report is subm itted." Both 
requirements are contained in a single volum e, issued by the USTR, titled 1 9 9 4  Trade  
Policy Agenda and 1 9 9 3  Annual Report of the President of the United S tates on the Trade 
Agreem ents Program .
Am bassador Kantor in the introduction to  the volume mentions briefly the following  
accom plishm ents: 1) the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, "the most far-reaching, most 
comprehensive trade agreem ent in history"; 2) the negotiation of supplemental agreem ents  
to  the North Am erican Free Trade A greem ent (NAFTA) and its approval by Congress; 3) at 
the Tokyo Sum m it, a m arket access agreem ent "which provided a jum p-start for the  
Uruguay Round" and a Fram ew ork for a N ew  Economic Partnership w ith  Japan; 4) a 
sum m it in Seattle  of Asia-Pacific Economic Leaders; 5) key bilateral agreem ents to  open 
"previously closed m arkets," such as electrical equipm ent w ith  Europe, construction w ith  
Japan, and telecom m unications w ith  Korea; finally, 5) dozens of bilateral agreem ents w ere  
negotiated "that help ensure th a t U .S . workers and companies can com pete fairly in the  
global econom y."
One of the main features of the strategy proposed, to consolidate and build upon 
these achievem ents, is an emphasis on reciprocity. In Am bassador Kantor's term s, "the 
United S tates is still the m ost open major trading nation in the w orld, but trade must be a
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tw o -w a y  s treet... Now  other nations m ust accept responsibility and open their m arkets. 
There can be no something for nothing."
The "major priorities" of the 1 9 9 4  agenda are:
1) The im plem entation of the Uruguay Round, including "wrapping up the final 
details of the Round and securing Congressional approval, establishing the new  W orld  
Trade Organization (W TO ), and implementing a system  to  ensure th a t agreem ents will be 
fully enforced."
2) Under the "expansion of regional trade," first com es the "im plem entation and 
monitoring of the various provisions" of the NAFTA; second, "deepening trade and 
investm ent ties" through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum; and third, tow ard  
Latin A m erica, the Adm inistration's approach is under review  "to determ ine w ith  which  
countries the United States should seek to  negotiate free trade agreem ents."
3) Bilateral initiatives include first, Japan under the Fram ew ork for a N ew  Economic 
Partnership; second, China will be asked to  "adhere fully to  its trade agreem ents,"  
including those on shipments of textiles and apparel, intellectual property and to  expand 
m arket access; third, w ith  the European Union (EU), to  "im plem ent the results of the  
Uruguay Round and to  address those problems not resolved by the Round," such as the  
Broadcast Directive, imposing quotas in the audiovisual sector, the Utilities Directive, 
covering telecom m unications, w a te r energy, and transport, and copyright legislation. Also, 
EU enlargem ent will be monitored to  m ake sure it "does not result in the im pairm ent of 
U.S. trade rights." Finally, in Russia, Eastern Europe and the N ew ly Independent S tates, 
"U .S . trade policy supports political and economic reform s."
4 ) Three specific areas are singled out as part of the agenda. On investm ent, a 
m ultilateral agreem ent on high level standards, and also bilateral and regional negotiations, 
will be pursued. On services, three multilateral negotiations will be initiated by m id-M ay on 
m aritim e, basic telecom m unications, and m ovem ent of persons, w ith  continuation of the  
ongoing negotiations on financial services. Finally, in intellectual property, "the major 
unresolved issue" in the Uruguay Round is characterized as "the application of the national 
treatm ent standard."
5) Under the enforcem ent of existing trade agreem ents and standards, Japan and 
China are the only countries singled out. Also, trading partners that discrim inate in 
telecom m unications and governm ent procurem ent, will be announced on April 3 0 , as will 
be those that will be subm itted to  "Super 301 " investigations on intellectual property 
protection. The USTR anticipates "a similarly active Special 301  season this year." Also, 
Section 301 will be used "to identify cases w hich should be taken to  the W T O  and on a 
bilateral basis, in cases "for which there is no recourse under the Round agreem ent."
6) Finally, a "post-Uruguay Round agenda" includes several so-called "new  issues." 
To deal w ith  them , the creation of tw o  com m ittees w ith in  the W T O  has been proposed: a 
perm anent com m ittee on trade and the environm ent, and second, an "interim com m ittee"  
to  deal w ith  antitrust and com petition policies, labor standards, illicit paym ents harmful to  
U.S. exporters and due process in G A T T /W T O  proceedings.
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V I.4 . BARRIERS TO  U .S . EXPORTS  
(W D W /1 3 /9 4  13 April 1 9 9 4 )
The release by the United S tates Trade Representative (USTR) of this year's  
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreion Trade Barriers to  U .S . Exports, as m andated by 
la w , took place on M arch 3 1 . Section 1 3 0 4  of the Omnibus Trade and Com petitiveness  
A c t of 1 9 8 8  requires "to submit to  the President, the Senate Finance C om m ittee, and 
appropriate com m ittees in the House of Representatives, an annual report on significant 
foreign trade barriers.” The issuance of this kind of Report has set a precedent, because 
other trading partners of the United S tates, such as Canada, the European Union, Japan  
and m ost recently Latin Am erica and the Caribbean, now  issue their ow n reports on U .S. 
barriers.
The Report contains "an inventory of the most im portant foreign barriers affecting  
U.S. exports of goods and services, foreign direct investm ent by U .S . persons, and 
protection of intellectual property rights." This year's objective of such an inventory is tw o  
folded. First, it "m ay facilitate negotiations aimed a t reducing or elim inate these barriers." 
Second, it is "a valuable tool in enforcing U .S . trade law s, w ith  the goal of expanding  
global trade, w hich benefits all nations."
H ow ever, this last objective is w h at makes this year's Report d ifferent from  the  
m ostly descriptive aim attribute to  previous Reports. For instance, in 1 9 9 2  the Report w as  
aimed a t "tracking barriers to  U .S . exports and for reporting progress in elim inating them ."
This year's Report is d ifferent because of President Clinton's reinstatem ent of the  
much dreaded 301 and "super 301  " investigations (W D W /8 /9 4 ). It is among those cited in 
the Report th a t will be selected, on Septem ber 3 0 , the "priority foreign country practices" 
that will be subm itted to  investigation, to  decide if they discriminate against U .S . exports.
The definition of trade barriers remains unchanged, it includes "governm ent law s, 
regulations, policies, or practices that either protect dom estic products from  foreign  
com petition or artificially stim ulate exports of particular dom estic products."
The barriers are also classified this year in the following eight categories: 1) import 
policies; 2) standards, testing, labeling, and certification; 3) governm ent procurement; 4) 
export subsidies; 5) lack of intellectual property protection; 6) services barriers; 7) 
investm ent barriers; 8) barriers th a t encompass more than one category or that a ffe c t a 
single sector.
Included in the Report are "the largest export m arkets for the United S tates,"  
including 3 6  nations, w ith  the N ew ly  Independent States of the form er Soviet Union as 
one unit, Ta iw an , and three regional bodies -- the Arab League, the European Union and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council.
By contrast w ith  last year's  Report, the number of Latin Am erican countries cited  
this year has increased from  ten  to  eleven, due to  the addition of three new com ers -- 
Dominican Republic, Honduras and Peru -- and the elimination of tw o  -- Ecuador and 
Paraguay. Therefore, cited again this year are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El 
Salvador, G uatem ala, M exico and Venezuela.
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The exclusion of some countries is "due to the relatively small size of their markets 
or the absence of major U.S. industry and agriculture trade complaints." However, 
absentees are cautioned that this "does not imply that they are no longer of concern for 
the United States."
Measured by the length of their citations, Japan appears in the first place with 44 
pages, followed by the European Union with 26; China is third with 15 pages, while 
Canada and Korea appear with 12 pages each.
The countries are listed alphabetically and the enumeration of the barriers is 
preceded by ranking each country according to its relative importance as an export market 
for the United States. Also mentioned is the amount of the U.S. trade deficit or surplus 
with each trading partner, the amount of U.S. imports, exports and investment, and 
estimates of the impact on U.S. exports of specific foreign trade barriers.
Not all the citations are negative. For instance, almost all the Latin American 
countries are commended for the unilateral reduction of tariff barriers. However, all of 
them are criticized for lack of adequate intellectual property protection, with Brazil, 
Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela also cited for government procurement and 
services barriers.
By contrast, Mexico's citation is briefer than last year's, because it includes mainly 
a description of how some existing barriers and obstacles will be removed with the 
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Chile preserves its relatively clean record, except a new citation for using "animal 
health and phitosanitary requirements in a non-transparent manner that has the effect of 
impeding imports."
Finally, El Salvador and Guatemala are again cited for import restrictions on poultry 
and a price band mechanism for basic grains, while Guatemala is also cited for allowing 
wheat imports by permit only.
VI.5. PRESIDENT CLINTON REQUESTS FAST TRACK AUTHORIZATION 
(WDW/19/94 29 June 1994)
In a bold move, last week. President Clinton sent to the U.S. Congress a request for 
fast track authority, to negotiate free trade agreements for seven years, until December 
2001.
The request has several components. First, it covers any kind of trade agreement, 
be it bilateral, regional or multilateral. Second, it covers both overall and principal 
negotiating objectives. Finally, the trade agreements can include barriers and non-tariff 
barriers.
One key point of the proposed legislation deals with the negotiating objectives. The 
overall negotiating objectives are the same as those included in previous legislation. Three
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of them come from the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, to obtain more 
open, equitable, and reciprocal market access; the reduction or elimination of barriers and 
other trade distorting policies and practices; and to strengthen the system of international 
trading disciplines and procedures. The last of these objectives, to foster economic growth 
and full employment in the United States and the global economy, comes from both the 
Trade Acts of 1988 and 1974.
Principal negotiating objectives include the elimination and reduction of barriers to 
trade in services, in financial services, and to foreign direct investment. Also, included is 
the effective protection of intellectual property and market access for those protected.
However, the most controversial of these principal objectives refer first, to "the 
promotion of internationally recognized labor standards and ensuring that their denial is not 
used to gain competitive advantage in trade"; and second, "the compatibility of 
international trade rules with environmental protection."
The last objective is a broader application of the "principle of transparency," 
covering public access to information regarding trade issues; clarity in the costs and 
benefits of trade policy actions; and the observance of open and equitable procedures in 
trade policy matters.
It is revealing that the battle lines regarding the proposed legislation are drawn along 
the inclusion of environmental and labor standards. The President's proposal draws a fine 
line between the proposals from his own Party and the Republican opposition.
From within the ranks of the President's own party, the House Majority Leader 
Richard Gephardt and other influential Democrats proposed, on May 9, the "Chile Free 
Trade Agreement Act of 1994." This bill grants fast track authority to the President, if 
"acceptable" labor and environmental conditions "are included in the basic text of the FTA 
that the President presents to Congress." Therefore, the decision to approve the 
negotiated agreement in fast track would only be made if it is judged that the proposed 
legislation contains these "acceptable provisions." Otherwise, "the legislation would be 
considered under the regular order in the House and the Senate." This amounts to 
conditioning the President's authority until the result is judged satisfactory, instead of the 
initial delegation of negotiating power that traditionally entails the fast track authorization.
To add weight, the announcement includes two letters of support from the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the 
Sierra Club. The letter from AFL-CIO's President Lane Kirkland reveals that "in March of 
this year, the AFL-CIO reached an agreement with its counterpart organization in Chile, the 
Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), which called for bilateral negotiations between the 
two countries that would result in, among other things, enforceable provisions on labor 
rights and standards."
The response from the opposition came in a letter from all 44 Republican senators 
to President Clinton, stating that they "cannot support inclusion of a broad extension of 
fast-track negotiating authority," because "the broad negotiating objectives. . .link trade to 
labor and environmental issues." The Republican senators also express that raising these 
issues "will further jeopardize consideration of the Uruguay Round implementing legislation 
this year."
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Initially pessimistic assessments of this confrontation perceive the Administration 
"trapped between Republicans and Democrats." In the terms of an unidentified 
congressional aide, "it is very difficult to convince Republicans to go along with anything 
on labor and the environment, and Democrats say they have to have something on labor 
and the environment.
However, the Administration's position, between the pressure from its own party 
and the Republican opposition, leaves it solidly placed in the middle. By occupying the 
middle ground, the Administration has flexibility to recruit the moderates from both sides. 
Additionally, since the request for fast track is part of the legislation to approve the 
Uruguay Round, a broad centrist coalition can be built around its approval. Therefore, the 
President can probably repeat the adept move that led to the approval of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
VI.6. WHY "FAST TRACK" WAS DROPPED 
(WDW/26/94 21 September 1994)
Last week, the Clinton Administration dropped the request, presented to the 
Congress by mid June, to negotiate trade agreements under "fast track" authorization 
(WDW/19/94).
Under this authorization, the President negotiates trade agreements that the 
Congress can only approve or reject, but not modify. Without this authorization, trade 
agreements negotiated by the executive branch may be subject to additions and 
substractions when they are presented to Congress for approval. The "fast track" 
authority enhances the credibility of U.S. trade negotiators, because negotiating partners 
can be reassured that trade agreements will be approved or rejected as negotiated, without 
amendments.
The request for "fast track" authority was presented by the Administration as part 
of the implementing legislation required to approve the results of the Uruguay Round. The 
authorization was deemed necessary in view of the forthcoming summit meetings of the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Summit of the Americas, to be 
held by the end of this year in Jakarta and Miami, respectively. The authorization was 
expected to strengthen President Clinton's hand in the discussions on trade relations that 
figure prominently in the agendas of both summits.
However, these justifications did not prove sufficient to bridge the distance that 
exists between the Democrats and the Republicans on the issue of including labor and 
environmental standards in free trade agreements (FTAs).
The Administration's original request, presented on June 15, contained among other 
"principal negotiating objectives," first, "the promotion of internationally recognized labor 
standards and ensuring that their denial is not used to gain competitive advantage in 
trade,” and second, "the compatibility of international trade rules with environmental 
protection."
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Searching for a middle course, the Administration's proposal spelled out both of 
these objectives in less strong terms than those that appeared in a bill presented on May 9 
by the House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO).
According to Congressman Gephardt's proposal the decision to approve a 
negotiated agreement in "fast track" would only be made if "acceptable" labor and 
environmental provisions "are included in the basic text of the FTA that the President 
presents to Congress."
However, even the more moderate terms presented by the Administration were too 
strong for business groups and Republican legislators, particularly in the Senate. Their 
position was that any linkage between labor and environment with trade negotiations 
should be scrapped, otherwise they threatened to delay the approval of the whole package 
of Uruguay Round implementing legislation.
Given this strong opposition, the Administration tried to find a solution and went as 
far as to modify the reference to labor and environmental standards. This led to an 
agreement with Republican legislators in the House of Representatives that was unable to 
overcome the mounting opposition from both sides. In effect, this compromise increased 
the already strong opposition from core Democratic constituencies, such as several 
environmental organizations and a group of pro-labor legislators, led by House Majority 
Whip David Bonior (D-MI).
In these conditions, the proposal to exclude the fast track request from the Uruguay 
Round legislation, originally made by the powerful head of the Senate Finance Committee 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), gained ground and finally prevailed. Even the American 
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) had threatened 
to join the Citizens Trade Campaign against the Uruguay Round legislation, if the fast track 
proposal remained in the bill.
Thus, the Administration this time was unable to place itself in the middle of the 
pressures from its own party and the Republican opposition. No middle ground could be 
found on labor and environmental standards to build a centrist coalition of both Democrats 
and Republicans, as the one that approved the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).
Unidentified "congressional sources characterized the deadlock as "a vicious circle," 
whereby the Administration finds it "impossible to move far enough to satisfy the 
Republicans without alienating Democratic support."
As declared by Representative Robert Matsui (D-CA), acting chairman of the Trade 
Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, "I think a clean fast track 
(without labor and environmental negotiating objectives) would have been a better way to 
start things out."
At issue now is if the Administration will be able to build the support necessary to 
approve the implementing legislation of the Uruguay Round. According to White House 
Chief of Staff Leon Panetta, "our primary objective is to get GATT passed . . . We're not 
going to let GATT go down."
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The other issue is if the Administration's agenda of linking trade negotiations to 
labor and environmental objectives will not hurt the bipartisan consensus that exists on 
trade liberalization. On that point Representative Matsui said, "I hope not, but only time 
will tell."
VI.7. TRADE AND THE NEW U.S. BALANCE OF POWER 
(WDW/34/94 16 November 1994)
Paradoxically, an issue that failed to become a hot topic, during the last political 
campaign, will be the first test of the new balance of power that emerged from the 
November 10 midterm elections in the United States.
The voter backlash, threatened by Ross Perot against those in favor of freer trade, 
did not materialize. During the debate on the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), Ross Perot, who according to the Journal of Commerce has now become "the 
country's leading protectionist," threatened those legislators who voted in favor of the 
NAFTA with the "little song . . . we'll remember in November."
On November 29 and 30, the departing 103rd Congress will convene in a lame duck 
session, to vote on the implementing legislation approving the Uruguay Round, signed by 
123 governments after more than seven years of negotiations.
According to an observer, in the ranks of the outgoing legislature, 82 members of 
the House of Representatives are "either retired or fired," while "11 senators are lame 
duck." Still, the vote on the Uruguay Round will show if there can be bipartisan 
cooperation on certain issues, between the first Republican dominated legislature in forty 
years and the Executive branch.
The lame duck session was the result of a bipartisan compromise between the 
Republican and the Democratic congressional leadership. Until the last minute, there were 
disagreements about the scope of the powers of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and about how to finance the loss of revenue caused by the tariff reductions envisaged by 
the Round. Also, the Republican refusal to approve the Uruguay Round was seen as a 
denial to President Clinton of a bipartisan victory before the November elections.
With the results of the elections giving the Republicans solid control of both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, the calls for bipartisanship from the Executive 
branch have intensified. In the first speech after the election, at Georgetown University, 
President Clinton said "the United States has been leading the world in pushing for the 
adoption of GATT. Now we've got to follow through and lead once again. We should not 
delay GATT. That would jeopardize our leadership and our prosperity."
Failure to approve the Uruguay Round, according to Treasury Secretary Lloyd 
Bentsen,"would be a turning point in the history of our country. It means we would be 
turning inward." Also, the President's chief of staff, Leon Panetta said after the election, 
"if we can have both the Democrats and the Republicans working together to get GATT 
passed, it could set, certainly, a better framework for the next session."
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The new speaker of the House, Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) has already said that he 
will support the Uruguay Round implementing legislation. The remaining doubts have been 
voiced by the new Senate Majority leader Robert Dole (R-Kan.). For instance, on the new 
World Trade Organization (WTO), Senator Dole has said that "the President needs to get 
out front and tell the American people what the World Trade Organization is and what it 
isn't."
Also lingering is the issue of how to finance the reductions in revenue caused by 
the lowering of tariffs agreed in the Uruguay Round, estimated to amount to $40 billion in 
the next ten years. The implementing legislation mandates $12.7 billion in spending cuts 
and new user fees that still fall short of the $31 billion in cuts required by the Senate. For 
this reason, the legislation includes a waiver of these budgetary rules that requires a 
majority of 60 votes for its approval in the Senate.
Even the Director General of the GATT has joined the debate by releasing, according 
to The Wall Street Journal "with a canny sense of timing," a new evaluation of the 
benefits that will generate the implementation of the Uruguay Round. According to 
GATT's Director General Peter Sutherland, "it seems inconceivable that the United States 
with so much to gain from the trade pact would fail to ratify it." For Sutherland, "even 
postponing a decision would be a mortal blow to the world trading system."
The new study by the GATT secretariat, taking into account the dynamic effects of 
the implementation of the Uruguay Round, doubles the static estimates that had set global 
income gains after ten years at around $250 billion.
According to the recently released figures, the United States would gain $122 
billion annually in net income, from an increase of 21.7 percent in exports by the year 
2005. The European Union (EU) comes out as the biggest winner, with net income gains 
of $164 billion annually by the year 2005, from an increase in exports of 19.4 percent. By 
contrast, Japan's gains are far more moderate, at $27 billion a year from an increase in 
exports of 18 percent during the same period. The developing countries and the 
economies in transition are projected to benefit together by an increase in yearly income of 
$116.1 billion by the year 2005. In all, the enforcement of the Uruguay Round is expected 
to increase annual world income by $510 billion by the year 2005.
With so much at stake, the coming vote in the U.S. Congress will determine if these 
impressive gains will become real. The House of Representatives will vote on November 
29, while the Senate is scheduled to do so the next day. Then, it will also be known if the 
U.S. economy remains open to international trade and if such openness still enjoys 
bipartisan support, within the new power balance that has emerged in the United States.
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VII. TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
VII.1. THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS 
(WDW/9/94 16 March 1994)
President Clinton formally announced, last Friday, that a "meeting of democratically 
elected heads of state and government" of the Western Hemisphere "will be held in early 
December in the City of Miami." As the President recalled, last December in Mexico City, 
Vice President Gore confirmed the intention to hold the summit, immediately after the 
approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Also, President Clinton 
briefly mentioned the proposed summit, last January, in the last State of the Union 
Address mainly dedicated to domestic issues.
In the formal announcement, President Clinton described some of the issues that 
will be included in the summit's agenda. He said, "we want to consider two broad 
themes: first, how to strengthen our democracies, defend them collectively and improve 
our governance; second, how to promote economic growth while advancing a strategy of 
sustainable development that protects the environment and alleviates poverty." These two 
broad topics are not exhaustive. President Clinton added that "to help to define our 
agenda, we will also encourage business, labor and nongovernmental organizations all 
across the hemisphere to exchange ideas and propose initiatives that can enrich the 
summit's deliberations."
There is ample evidence that a "process of intensive consultation," has already 
started in several fronts. For instance, the President announced that Vice President Gore 
will travel, this week, to Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil. Also, two major presentations with 
more details about the summit were recently made by the two highest ranking officials of 
the Clinton Administration who deal with inter-American affairs. These presentations were 
made by Richard Feinberg, Special Assistant to the President for Inter-American Affairs and 
by Alexander Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
Both statements complement the President's announcement and should be seen as 
authoritative, since the authors are co-chairpersons of the interagency task force 
responsible for the coordination of the summit's preparatory activities. Feinberg spoke at 
the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), in Atlanta, on March 10. 
Watson spoke at the Institute of the Americas' "1994 Hemispheric Policy Forum," in La 
Jolla, on March 2. Also, both statements complement each other, since Watson presents 
a comprehensive overview of hemispheric relations, while Feinberg focuses on several 
details about the summit.
The core of Feinberg's presentation is the notion of "substantive symmetry," 
described as a "new era in which all countries -- North and South -- face a similar agenda 
rooted in their common participation in one world economy." Watson also sees a process 
of "convergence" in the hemisphere, on security without external threats, on democratic 
pluralism and market economics and on addressing multilaterally transnational issues, such 
as migrations, drugs, human rights or the environment.
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Within this context, for Feinberg the hemispheric agenda contains three major 
topics. First, the promotion of democracy, including good governance, domestic dialogue, 
nonpartisan engagement by the United States and the collective defense of democracy. 
Second, to advance economic growth, through open regionalism and streamlining the 
state. Finally, to address the social agenda, by shifting resources toward the poor.
For Watson, the Clinton Administration hemispheric policies cover the following 
topics. First, multilateral and bilateral instruments to support democracy and economic 
reform. Second, NAFTA has a key role to play in the advancement of economic reform in 
the hemisphere. Third, subregional economic integration is a sound base for further 
progress toward hemispheric free trade. Fourth, the challenge of poverty has to be 
confronted. Finally, effective democratic governance, by improving the functioning of 
government, its efficiency and honesty.
The announcement of the hemispheric summit puts to rest the concern, sometimes 
voiced in Latin America, that the Clinton Administration was more interested in other parts 
of the world, such as the former socialist bloc, the Middle East or the dynamic Asia-Pacific 
region.
Furthermore, the Clinton Administration is aware of the uniqueness of the event. In 
President Clinton's terms, the summit will be "the first meeting of hemispheric leaders in 
over a generation, and it will be the first-ever meeting of democratically elected leaders." 
Also, as described by Feinberg, this "once-in-a-generation opportunity" will be "the first 
ever held in the United States."
Concerning the results expected, Feinberg says that the summit "offers a unique 
opportunity to capitalize on the unprecedented convergence of democratic values and 
economic thought throughout the hemisphere." Therefore, it "will test whether 
hemispheric leaders can transform shared values into concrete work plans."
Finally, according to Feinberg, "a productive Summit will catalyze consensus, give 
impetus to fresh ideas, set in motion a series of ministeriais and fortify multilateral 
mechanisms." Feinberg concludes that "if the Summit of the Americas succeeds, it will 
inspire hemispheric relations for the rest of this century and beyond."
VII.2. EXTENDING NAFTA: WHO IS NEXT? 
(WDW/21/94 13 July 1994)
Two expected events gave ground to the belief that there would soon be an answer 
to who is next in the line of accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). One event was the previously announced visit to Washington of the newly 
elected President Eduardo Frei of Chile. The other was an obligation emanating from the 
NAFTA implementing legislation. Both events have now passed and except for Chile the 
question of who else is next remains unanswered.
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Section 108 of the NAFTA implementing legislation states that the Administration 
has to "determine with which foreign country or countries, if any, the United States should 
seek to negotiate a free trade area agreement or agreements."
This requirement consists of two steps that had to be given at specifically 
determined deadlines. The first step directed the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to 
submit, by May 1, 1994, "a report on significant market opening," to the President and to 
the Committee of Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
House of Representatives.
Probably as evidence of the discomfort caused by the requirement of naming 
individual countries, the USTR report covered all regions of the world and ranked every U. 
S. trading partner by the amount of U.S. exports. In the letter of transmission, the USTR 
expressly indicated that this ranking of trading partners "should not be interpreted as an 
indication of which countries might ultimately be selected." This amounted to a 
postponement, until the next deadline, of the decision on naming the potential candidates 
for negotiating free trade agreements. The next step consisted in requiring that the 
President "submit to the appropriate Congressional Committees, no later than July 1,
1994, a report containing recommendations on future trade area negotiations."
In spite of such a clear requirement, the President's report pointedly says that "we 
are not now in a position to identify specific countries or groups of countries."
Furthermore, to avoid restricting the mandate to any specific type of agreement, the report 
"addresses primarily the issue of bilateral and regional arrangements including, but not 
limited to, free trade areas."
Meanwhile, just before the July 1 deadline, President Eduardo Frei of Chile made an 
official visit to Washington. This led to some speculation about a possible linkage between 
President Frei's visit and the designation of potential candidates for free trade area 
negotiations.
Such speculation was dispelled promptly by one paragraph contained in the single 
page statement, issued by the White House Office of the Press Secretary, describing the 
results of President Frei's visit.
The statement says that "President Clinton reaffirmed to President Frei his firm 
commitment to negotiate a free trade agreement next with Chile now that the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round negotiations have been 
completed." Also, "the Administration is working with Congress to obtain fast track 
authority as the first step toward formal U.S.-Chilean negotiations" (WDW/19/94). Finally, 
"the two presidents asked the United States Trade Representative and the Chilean Minister 
of Finance to provide them a joint recommendation on the best avenue for a Free Trade 
Agreement -- whether bilateral or NAFTA accession."
Consequently, at this point, Chile is the only country designated as a potential 
candidate for negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States. Additionally, if 
the negotiation will result in a bilateral agreement or in accession to the NAFTA will be 
based on the "joint recommendation" of the USTR and the Chilean Minister of Finance.
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This last point was clarified by President Clinton, on June 28, during the "photo 
opportunity" with President Frei, at the Oval Office. Asked if the Clinton Administration 
would "favor Chile entering through NAFTA or through a free trade agreement, which is 
bilateral?" President Clinton answered: "I don't really have an opinion on that at this time.
I want to discuss it with the President, and I want our advisers to be able to discuss it and 
just determine the best way."
Clarifying also the order of priorities. President Clinton added, "the most important 
thing for me now is to get the Congress to approve the fast track negotiations with Chile 
so that we can accelerate this economic partnership whichever way we decide to go." To 
conclude. President Clinton said it was "very important. . .  to know that the Congress 
will support that, because I have said all along that I thought we ought to move next with 
this free trade agreement to Chile . . . that could be a model for all of South America."
The President's report to the Congress on future free trade area negotiations notes 
that given the ongoing consultations on the December Summit of the Americas, "other 
than Chile, the Administration is not now prepared to name specific countries as 
candidates for future free trade area agreements." Consequently, "passage of the Uruguay 
Round implementing legislation is our immediate top trade legislation priority with the 
Congress. It is our intention that this legislation contain renewed trade agreement 
authority and fast track procedures."
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VIII. MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
VIII.1. FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS 
(WDW/23/94 27 July 1994)
Fifty years ago, on July 22, ended the meeting of the victorious allied powers that 
created the Bretton Woods institutions. So-called, after the village in New Hampshire 
where the "founding fathers" sat in conference for three weeks at the Mount Washington 
Hotel.
As depicted by some observers, the meeting saw a clash and a compromise 
between the U.S. delegate Harry Dexter White and the intellectual inspiration of John 
Maynard Keynes. White pushed for fixed exchange rates in an open trading system, 
Keynes argued for exchange rate flexibility, trade controls and preferential agreements.
Moving toward the future with their heads turned to the past, both delegations 
compromised around the objective of avoiding a repetition of the Great Depression. The 
agreement was later known as a system of "stable but adjustable" exchange rates pegged 
to the dollar, which was ultimately also pegged to gold.
At its conclusion, the Bretton Woods conference decided the creation of the Bank 
and the Fund, to oversee the functioning of the "system" and to finance the reconstruction 
of Europe. Christopher Fildes reminded in the Daily Telegraph that John Maynard Keynes 
described the conference as "a monstrous monkey-house" that confused the identity of its 
creatures. The Fund was closer to a central bank, while the Bank was more a fund for 
reconstruction and development.
Be it as it may, these twin institutions were immediately overtaken by events. 
Stanford University Professor Ronald McKinnon pointed, in the first article of a Financial 
Times series on the fiftieth anniversary of Bretton Woods, that until 1971 the world lived 
under a "Marshall-Dodge fixed dollar standard." This "system" was inaugurated by the 
Marshall plan for the reconstruction of Europe and by the Dodge plan for the reconstruction 
of Japan, with the dollar as the anchor of "stable but adjustable" exchange rates.
True, under this "system" the world economy experienced, during the "first two 
post-war decades," what The Economist characterized with "no exaggeration . . .  as a 
golden age of trade and growth, a time without parallel in the economic history of the 
world." Although the credit for this outstanding achievement cannot be fully attributed to 
the Bretton Woods institutions, at least they did not stand against it.
By contrast, it can be argued that what these institutions have exhibited is an 
outstanding capacity for adaptation to changing circumstances.
For instance, once it was obvious that the reconstruction of war ravaged areas 
would not be a lasting task, their attention turned toward the developing countries. The 
first World Bank loan to a developing country was granted to Chile in 1947.
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Also, events such as the devaluation of the U.S. dollar in 1971, the two oil shocks 
of the seventies and the debt crisis of the eighties, moved these institutions into actively 
promoting financial rescue operations among developing economies, even with some 
degree of overlapping among their functions.
Today, the Bretton Woods institutions are actively engaged in supporting the 
transition of the formerly centrally planned economies into market economies. At fifty, 
these institutions have attained universal membership of 178 countries and have been 
adept, again, at finding a new reason for their existence. Despite what some observers 
see as their "spreading a little around the waist" and their exhibiting the "signs of mid-life 
crisis."
Therefore, the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods conference has generated 
an impressive flurry of comments, even criticisms and some proposals for profound if not 
radical reform. Among the criticisms, one of the most publicized has come out from a 
coalition of more than fifty nongovernmental organizations that call themselves "the Fifty 
Years is Enough Coalition." The members of this coalition are organizations such as Oxfam 
America, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace USA. Their criticisms have been mainly 
addressed to the World Bank, for doing "more harm than good."
At the other end of the spectrum appears the prestigious "Bretton Woods 
Commission," that describes itself as "a private independent group of senior individuals 
with experience in international finance, development and economics and related areas of 
public policy." Almost nostalgically, the Bretton Woods Commission report, chaired by the 
former head of the US Federal Reserve Board Paul Volcker, concludes that what is required 
is a return to a less volatile monetary system based on "flexible exchange rate bands."
These proposals and criticisms have had their effect, because the final communique 
of the Naples Summit (WDW/22/94) declares that next years' summit in Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, will aim at revitalizing the World Bank and the IMF and even the G-Seven itself.
The aim is to respond to the question of how "the global economy of the 21st century will 
provide sustainable development with good prosperity and well-being of the peoples of our 
nations and the world?"
VIII.2. THE IMF'S ANNUAL REPORT
(WDW/25/94 14 September 1994)
This year's advanced copy of the IMF's Annual Report was released by the 
Executive Board at the end of July, on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton 
Woods conference and well ahead of the annual meetings of the Board of Governors, to be 
held in Madrid at the end of September.
The first part of the Report contains a description of the evolution of "the global 
economy," during the financial year ending on April 1994. This first part describes the 
main developments in the world economy and the Board's consideration of the world 
economic outlook (WDW/14/94); international capital markets; and non-oil commodity 
prices.
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The second part, titled "the Fund in 1993/94," contains a description of Fund's 
activities, including its surveillance role; the financial support granted to members; 
technical assistance activities; and financial operations.
Several appendices to the Report provide additional information, such as statistical 
data on international reserves and on the Fund's financial operations; the principal policy 
decisions adopted during the year; press communiques, administrative and capital budgets, 
and financial statements.
The Fund's surveillance activities were carried out against the background of a 
world economy experiencing "a modest recovery." The second part of this year's Report, 
under the surveillance heading, contains more summaries of "Article IV consultations with 
member countries." The number of summaries has been expanded, to "cover selected 
developing countries and economies in transition, as well as industrial countries." The 
Report contains surveys of the three largest Latin American economies, Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico.
Additionally, for the first time, these summaries include a description of "significant 
economic developments during the period leading up to each consultation, a table of 
selected data available at the time of the Board discussion, and a review of the discussion 
of the Board."
Also for the first time, the Report contains a description of some implications of IMF 
supported "reform measures on vulnerable groups and how social safety nets can be 
integrated into reform programs."
With the admission of Micronesia, in June 1993, the Fund "moved even closer to a 
universality of membership." On 6 July 1994, the admission of Eritrea brought total 
membership to 179 countries, with applications pending for two more countries.
This expansion in membership and the payments of quota increases by 170 
governments, under the Ninth General Review, pushed the total amount of Fund quotas, at 
the end of the financial year, to SDR 144.9 billion. Thus, in 1993/94, the Fund's "liquidity 
position strengthened to SDR 54.3 billion, compared with SDR 52.2 a year earlier."
During the 1993/94 financial year, "drawings (purchases) from the IMF's general 
resources" totaled SDR 5.2 billion, about the same level of the previous two financial 
years. "Repayments (repurchases) amounted to SDR 4.3 billion in 1993/94, compared 
with SDR 4.1 billion in 1992/93." The largest drawings were made by Russia (SDR 2.2 
billion); Argentina and South Africa (SDR 0.6 billion each); Poland (SDR 0.4 billion); and 
India (SDR 0.2 billion).
For the second year, the level of outstanding overdue obligations, during 1993/94, 
experienced a small decline to SDR 2.9 billion. As of April 1994, 9 countries were in 
arrears, compared to 12 countries the previous year. Five of these countries were 
ineligible to use the IMF's general resources-Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire and Zambia.
For the first time, in August 1993, Sudan's voting and related rights were suspended, as 
were those of Zaire on June 1994. These two cases are the first two applications of the 
provisions of the Third Amendment of the Articles of Agreement, which entered into effect 
in November 1992.
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In June 1994, the Board of Directors approved "the first major change in the 
structure of the IMF's senior management since 1949, when the position of Deputy 
Managing Director was established." As proposed by the Managing Director, the number 
of Deputy Managing Directors increased to three. Mr. Stanley Fischer was appointed First 
Deputy Managing Director and the other two appointed were Mr. Alassane D. Ouattara and 
Prabhakar R. Narvekar. Each Deputy Managing Director has authority "to chair Board 
meetings and maintain contacts with officials of member governments and Executive 
Directors, the media and other institutions."
For the performance of these activities, the Fund has experienced "the largest staff 
increase" in its history. Since 1991/92 "the Fund's budgeted staff resources have 
increased by 507 staff years, a substantial majority having been devoted to work with the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union." By the end of 
1993/94 the Fund's regular staff reached 2610 staff years from 114 countries, compared 
to 2100 the previous year from the same number of countries.
The Fund's administrative budget for 1993/94 increased to $476.8 million, from 
$389 million in 1992/93. The capital budget amounted to $124.8 million, including "$111 
million for the construction of an addition to the headquarters building."
VIII.3. THE WORLD BANK'S ANNUAL REPORT 
(WDW/27/94 28 September 1994)
Covering the fiscal year (FY) that goes from 1 July 1993 to 30 June 1994, the 
World Bank's Annual Report includes the following sections: 1 ) Executive Board's 
activities; 2) a global perspective of the economic scene; 3) major programs; 4) operations; 
5) regional perspectives, with a segment dedicated to Latin America and the Caribbean; 6) 
services and activities by other members of the World Bank Group, including those of the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); and 7) 
the Bank's finances.
With the admission of the Republic of Macedonia, by the end of the fiscal year, the 
number of Bank members reached 177. Action was pending on membership for Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Eritrea and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Total new lending commitments by the World Bank Group in FY 94 amounted to 
$20.8 billion, down by $2.8 billion from the previous year. From this total, almost all the 
decrease was accounted by Bank lending, from $16.9 billion to $14.2 billion in FY 94. 
International Development Association (IDA) commitments in FY 94 amounted to $6.5 
billion, only marginally below FY 93's $6.7 billion. Overall, gross disbursements also 
decreased in FY 94, from $12.9 billion from the Bank and $4.9 billion from IDA, to $10.4 
and $5.5 billion, respectively.
Lending in FY 94 remained below the indicative lending goals set in the budget, at 
between $17 and $19.5 billion. This shortfall was almost fully accounted for by the 
decrease in adjustment lending from more than $4 billion in FY 93, to $2.4 billion in FY 94.
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Fast disbursement adjustment lending in FY 94 declined to 12 percent of total lending, 
from 17 percent in FY 93. According to the Bank, "to a certain extent, the decline in 
adjustment lending has been purposeful, especially in Latin America, where the transition 
from adjustment to lending operations is well under way." Also, there has been a decrease 
in the balance of payments justification of adjustment lending, given "the explosive 
increase, to $177 billion net, during 1993 of capital flows to developing countries."
The sector that accounted for the largest number of commitments in FY 94 was 
agriculture, with 18.8 percent, while human resources followed, with 15.8 percent. The 
largest borrowers of Bank funds in FY 94 were China ($2.1 billion for eight projects), 
followed by Mexico ($1.53 billion for five projects) and Russia ($1.52 billion for six 
projects). The three largest borrowers of IDA credits were also China ($925 million for six 
projects), India ($835 million for six projects) and Bangladesh ($597 million for three 
projects).
The segment dedicated to Latin America and the Caribbean describes the region in 
1993 showing "large disparities in growth rates across countries, a definite downward 
trend in inflation in most countries, continued capital inflows, significant expansion of 
regional trade, and a growing perception that investment in social and economic 
infrastructure must be increased."
However, the less bright spot is that "despite relatively high per capita income 
levels in most countries, poverty and income distribution continue to be major problems." 
According to the Bank, "about 32 percent of the region's population lives in poverty, and 
the lower 20 percent on the income scale receives only 4 percent of total gross domestic 
product (GDP)." Also, "the level of poverty is particularly acute among indigenous groups. 
Poverty in these groups is in excess of 70 percent in Peru and Bolivia and more than 80 
percent in Mexico and Guatemala--rates significantly higher than those of the 
nonindigenous populations."
The Bank describes "the region's challenges" as "to reduce poverty and increase 
the well-being of its people through environmentally sustainable development." 
Consequently, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Bank will continue "the planned 
transition in lending from adjustment to long-term issues-human resources development, 
environmentally sustainable development, and private sector development."
For this purpose, the Bank's proposed program for Latin America and the Caribbean 
in FY 1994-96 "shows a decline in lending for adjustment and debt reduction from 24 
percent to 3 percent, an increase in lending for human resources/poverty reduction from 23 
percent to 33 percent, and an increase in environment and forestry commitments from 7 
percent to 13 percent." This "focus on human resources and poverty issues," concludes 
the Bank, "reflects the region's historically highly stratified social structure and skewed 
distribution of income."
To carry out its activities, the Bank's administrative budget amounted to $1.38 
billion in FY 94 and $1.42 billion approved for FY 95. At the end of FY 94, the Bank 
employed 6,338 regular and fixed-term staff, of whom 4,145 were higher-level staff from 
123 nations, 59 percent from industrialized countries and 41 percent from developing 
countries. Women employed as higher-level staff increased by the end of FY 94 from 28.4 
percent to 30.0 percent. The staff increased, in FY 94, by 2.3 percent, with 257 new
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higher-level staff recruited, of whom 32.7 percent from developing countries and 39.3 
percent were women.
VIII.4. THE IMF-WORLD BANK MEETINGS IN MADRID 
(WDW/30/94 19 October 1994)
This year's annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank were held in Madrid's Palacio Municipal de Congresos at the Campo de las Naciones, 
from September 29 to October 6.
To celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods institutions(WDW/23/94), 
the meetings were preceded by a conference on "Fifty Years After Bretton Woods: The 
Future of the IMF and the World Bank." However, the birthday celebrations were disrupted 
by the presence of several nongovernmental organizations, camped outside the meetings.
As reported by The Washington Post, two demonstrators from the environmental 
organization Greenpeace, during the inaugural speech pronounced by King Juan Carlos of 
Spain, "showered fake dollar bills” on the participants. The bills were marked with slogans 
such as "50 years of destruction," reminiscent of the highly publicized catchphrase coined 
by the "Fifty Years Is Enough" coalition of nongovernmental organizations.
These organizations also held a parallel "Alternative Forum" to the official meetings 
that issued a declaration saying: "on the threshold of the turn of the century, the 
distressing history of the Bretton Woods institutions should be merely an unpleasant 
memory, a lesson not to be forgotten."
Beyond these incidents, the main highlights of the meetings were the mostly upbeat 
assessments of the state of the world economy and a nondecision.
On the present state of the world economy, the Interim Committee of the Board of 
Governors of the IMF issued a "Declaration on Cooperation to Strengthen the Global 
Expansion." The Declaration first asserts that "the immediate prospects for economic 
growth in the world economy are better than they have been at any time in this decade."
Also positively reviewed is the evolution of the developing economies, of the 
economies in transition and of the industrial countries. The declaration concludes with the 
description of three central elements of a common strategy "to strengthen growth and 
reduce unemployment, while safeguarding the progress toward price stability" in the 
industrial countries.
The three elements of the strategy are: 1) "structural reforms to eliminate 
impediments to sustained growth," such as dismantling nontariff barriers, the long-term 
financial viability of health and public pension systems, and fundamental labor market 
reforms; 2) "to significantly reduce fiscal deficits beyond the effects of cyclical recovery, 
and cut debt to GDP ratios, thereby facilitating lower real interest rates"; 3) "to adjust 
monetary conditions to maintain price stability, as a condition for sustaining medium-term 
growth, including by timely increases in interest rates with a view to preventing the
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emergence of inflationary pressures." Finally, the Interim Committee decided to review the 
progress in the implementation of the common strategy at its Spring 1995 meeting.
Despite these optimistic assessments, difficulties appeared when dealing with the 
issue of increasing the access to the Fund resources. On the existing limits to the access 
to IMF resources, the Interim Committee recommended to the Executive Board of the IMF 
to increase "the annual access limits from 68 percent to at least 85 percent of quota."
The nondecision had to do with the allocation of 36 billion in Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs), originally proposed by the Managing Director of the IMF, with the support of the 
developing countries and the transition economies.
The Group of Seven, according to the U.S. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, 
supported the allocation of only SDR 16 billion, dedicated to the forty new members that 
have joined the IMF since the last SDR allocation in 1979-80. Secretary Bentsen declared, 
in the summary of the G-7 deliberations, "we will not accept a general allocation of SDRs. 
What the G-7 members want is an allocation that offers the most benefit to the present 
countries and the economies which are now in transition."
Since the allocation of SDRs is the kind of decision that demands the approval of at 
least 85 percent of Board members, the majority was not reached either for the "general 
allocation" of SDR 36 billion, proposed by the Managing Director, or for the SDR 16 billion 
supported by the G-7.
As described by Managing Director Camdessus, the 36 billion he recommended 
comprised the SDR 16 billion for a special allocation supported by the G-7 and a general 
allocation of SDR 20 billion, of which SDR 11 billion would go to the industrial countries 
that are members of the G-Ten.
The press saw this nondecision as a manifestation of clout by the developing 
countries. As David Wessel said in the Wall Street Journal, the "developing countries 
flexed their muscles for perhaps the first time in the 5-year history of the postwar financial 
institutions."
The Interim Committee Chairperson, Belgium's Minister of Finance Philippe 
Maystadt, agreed when he said: "there was a demonstration today that, in certain 
circumstances, all the members cannot be forced just to accept what the G-7 has decided 
the previous day. I think in a way it is kind of premiere. I have attended this meeting for 
some years now, and it was a little bit refreshing that all was not settled the previous day.
VIII.5. MAINSTREAMING GUARANTEES AT THE WORLD BANK 
(WDW/32/94 2 November 1994)
The recent trend in private financing of infrastructure projects (WDW/31/94) has 
been recognized at the World Bank. On September 8, the Board of Directors approved the 
proposal made by President Preston, in a Memorandum dated 11 July 1994, "to make 
more extensive use of the Bank's guarantee authority."
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Despite its recognition in the Banks' Articles of Agreement, President Preston 
admits that "for a variety of reasons, guarantees have been utilized only sporadically in the 
context of dedicated programs and have never found a widespread role in Bank 
operations."
Previous attempts, linked to co-financing operations, led in 1991 to the first 
application of a Bank guarantee to a private sector infrastructure project, the Hub Power 
Project in Pakistan, a privately financed 1.2 MW thermal power plant. However, according 
to President Preston, recent developments "indicate that guarantees should become a 
much more significant form of Bank support."
Among these developments, first, "the financing needs for development of 
infrastructure in developing countries are now estimated to be very large and well beyond 
the capacity of the official sources alone to support." Based on the last World 
Development Report 1994 (WDW/18/94), the Bank estimated that infrastructure 
investment in developing countries will exceed $200 billion per year. Second, "Bank 
borrowers are turning to the private sector to invest in infrastructure projects through a 
variety of private ownership arrangements".(WDW/31/94). Finally, in contrast to the 
eighties, "several developing countries have now re-established access to private markets.”
All these factors generate "both a need and an opportunity for the Bank to help 
mobilize capital for long-term developmental investments in these countries." Also, since 
"market forces alone are likely to generate short-term and portfolio investments . . . the 
Bank's guarantee can be an effective tool to utilize the Bank's intermediation capability in 
this situation."
By offering guarantees, the Bank seeks "to help mobilize private sector financing for 
individual projects through targeted and limited support, and to leverage the Bank's 
participation." Specifically, these guarantees "can be targeted to mitigate against specific 
risks--generally risks of political, regulatory and governmental performance -- which in 
particular projects the private sector may not be in a position to absorb or manage."
Additionally, for several reasons, "the comparative advantage of Bank's guarantees 
is most apparent in infrastructure investments." First, infrastructure projects "require large 
amount of funds with extended maturities to match the long pay-back periods normally 
associated with such projects." Second, in these projects, the government is always 
involved in several ways, "as the provider of some of the inputs, as the purchaser of 
outputs, or as regulator." Finally, these projects "generally serve domestic markets and 
earn revenues in local currency, which creates a foreign exchange exposure for foreign 
investors."
Two types of guarantees will be offered by the Bank. Partial risk guarantees, for 
sovereign contractual obligations, including transfer risk and partial credit guarantees, to 
cover the long-term portion of the financing required by the project.
Government contractual obligations include: "(i) maintenance of an agreed 
regulatory framework; (ii) delivery of inputs or payment of outputs . . . and (iii) 
compensation for delays of interruption of project operations caused by governmental 
actions, or political force majeure." The transfer risks "arise from excessive delays in 
acquiring foreign exchange caused by the government's action or failure to act."
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The partial credit guarantees "can be structured to help transform the available 
medium-term funding to the longer term," or "to encourage term transformation." This can 
be done through guarantees for "(i) the longer-dated maturities . . . (ii) to provide 
incentives for lenders to roll over their medium-term loans at maturity; (iii) liquidity 
guarantees . . . (iv) rolling guarantees that cover a fixed number of scheduled payments."
Guarantees can generate several benefits. For the investors and for the 
governments, first, "to leverage Bank support by catalyzing additional private resources"; 
second, "to channel necessary Bank support to private sector projects, while greatly 
limiting the government's obligation and risks"; third, to "help establish a track record of 
implementation and contractual performance crucial to increased investor confidence."
For the Bank, "besides providing an effective tool for supporting private sector 
projects, guarantees inevitably get the Bank involved more directly and explicitly with 
private borrowers and lenders, thereby building partnerships with the private sector within 
individual country assistance strategies."
In exchange, the Bank must obtain a counter-guarantee from the beneficiary 
government, by means of an "Indemnity Agreement, whereby the Government agrees to 
indemnify the Bank in respect of any payments made by the Bank under its guarantee."
To conclude, the Board will review the experience with guarantees when "the 
volume reaches 5% of the outstanding IBRD portfolio of loans and guarantees." This limit 
will be "achieved within 3-4 years, assuming $1-2 billion of guarantee operations per 
year.”

